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Summary  
Recovery of state aid is a pillar of the state aid control system. Aid in breach 
of Article 107 and 108(3) TFEU, incompatible aid, is retrieved in full, 
whereas aid which is only in breach of the standstill obligation, Article 
108(3), is the subject to payment of interest. The Union acknowledges three 
exemptions to the recovery obligation: a recovery is in breach of Union 
principles, the aid was paid out over ten years ago and lastly, when a recovery 
is absolutely impossible. Recovery decisions are not common since the state 
aid control system systematically aims to solve the situations earlier in the 
process. Successful defence of recovery cases are a rarity, they represent a 
narrowly interpreted derogation from a small pool of cases.  
 
The general purpose of the state aid control system is to protect the 
functioning of the Internal market. The specific aim of recovery is not as clear. 
Arguably, the specific measure of recovery serves three purposes: to remedy 
the anti-competitive effect, to retrieve the monetary benefit and to deter.  
 
In a defence of recovery of state aid process, the only parties are the Member 
State and the Commission. The interest of the beneficiary is not a priority. 
This thesis analyses whether, while protecting the functioning of the Internal 
market and while remaining within the limits of the general state aid control 
system, the measure of state aid recovery can be adjusted to the benefit of the 
beneficiary. While the case law is to be approached with a certain caution, 
adjustments are achievable, albeit the scope of change is limited.  
 
Through readjusting the focus of the recovery, from the retrieval of the pure 
monetary benefit, to remedy the anti-competitive effect and deterrence, the 
system can provide the beneficiary with a more favourable interpretation of 
the principles of proportionality, legal certainty and legitimate expectations.  
 
Greater deterrence is achieved by adjusting the interpretation of the principle 
of legal certainty, by improving the procedural standing of the beneficiary 
and by letting the Member States face the consequences of their actions. 
Further, the social and financial stability of the Member States may, in certain 
cases, be more important to the protection of the Internal market than an 
immediate recovery, which is an advantage to the beneficiary.  
 
To prevent abuse of the aid mechanism, state aid is under strict supranational 
control. The ongoing decentralisation of the control system is thus an 
indication that the system is efficient and stable. This development, in 
conjunction with analogies from EU funds law, indicates that the Internal 
market is sufficiently stable to allow for increasingly relaxed interpretations 
of the exemptions ´absolutely impossible´, legal certainty and legitimate 
expectations. 
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Sammanfattning 
Återkrav av felaktigt utbetalt statsstöd är en grundbult i statstödssystemet. 
Statsstöd som är oförenligt med den inre marknaden, artikel 107 FEUF, och 
som strider mot genomförandeförbudet i artikel 108(3), ska återkrävas i sin 
helhet. Stöd som enbart strider mot genomförandeförbudet medför krav på att 
mottagaren ska betala ränta. 
 
Kravet på återbetalning får dock inte strida mot en unionsprincip, den tioåriga 
preskriptionstiden får inte ha löpt ut och det får heller inte vara omöjligt att 
verkställa. Det är inte vanligt förekommande att återbetalningskrav bestrids 
framgångsrikt dels för att systemet är konstruerat för att förebygga att krav 
uppstår, dels för att undantagen tolkas restriktivt. Kontrollsystemets generella 
syfte är att skydda den inre marknaden. Det specifika syftet med återbetalning 
är dock inte helt klarlagt. Föreliggande uppsats identifierar tre syften med 
återbetalningen: att upphäva den ekonomiska fördelen, att upphäva stödets 
konkurrensbegränsande verkan och att förebygga felaktiga utbetalningar. 
 
Statsstödssystemet tillmäter inte så stor vikt vid mottagarens intressen. 
Mottagaren har inte heller starka processuella rättigheter. Den här uppsatsen 
syftar till att undersöka om det är möjligt att, inom ramen för 
statsstödsystemet, bibehålla skyddet för den inre marknaden men samtidigt 
förbättra stödmottagarens ställning; främst möjlighet till ett framgångsrikt 
försvar. En viss försiktighet bör alltid iakttas men den här uppsatsen ger stöd 
för att det är möjligt att genomföra vissa begränsade justeringar. 
 
Genom att betona vikten av att upphäva den konkurrensbegränsande effekten 
och vikten av att förebygga framtida felaktigheter, snarare än att upphäva den 
rent monetära effekten, blir det möjligt att ändra tolkningen av principen om 
proportionalitet, rättssäkerhet och berättigade förväntningar. 
 
Systemet skulle i högre grad kunna förebygga utbetalningar av felaktigt stöd 
om tolkningen av principen om rättssäkerhet justeras. Ytterligare 
förbättringar skulle uppnås om stödmottagaren fick en förstärkt processuell 
ställning och om medlemslandet, och inte stödmottagaren, i ökad grad får ta 
konsekvenserna av felaktiga utbetalningar. En stödmottagare gynnas av att 
den inre marknaden, i vissa situationer, bättre skyddas av att medlemsstaterna 
är socialt och ekonomisk stabila än om återkravet verkställs omedelbart. 
 
För att förebygga att staterna missbrukar systemet är statsstödskontrollen 
centraliserad. Den i viss mån pågående decentraliseringen av systemet tyder 
på att systemet är solitt. Stabiliteten gör att undantagen om absolut omöjlig 
verkställighet, att återbetalningen strider mot rättssäkerhetsprincipen eller 
principen om berättigade förväntningar kan tolkas till förmån för mottagaren, 
utan att den inre marknadens stabilitet hotas. Slutsatsen stöds av 
analogitolkning av praxis från strukturfondsområdet.  
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1 Introduction  
1.1 Introduction to state aid recovery 
The ugly sister of the competition law family, state aid has been characterised 
as ineffective, unclear and, to the beneficiary, incomprehensible. The 
situation is quite noteworthy, considering state aid control shall “above all”1 
prevent barriers impeding access to the market and ensure the competition on 
the Internal market. 
 
The primary remedy of illicit aid is recovery. Any aid paid out in breach of 
the substantive law must be recovered in full. In the event of the aid being 
paid out in breach with the procedural law, the beneficiary must only pay 
interest. Since illegitimate aid is retrieved to the Member State and not to the 
Union, hence the system has been described as “draconian”2. In 2011, the 
Commission made six recovery decisions, a decline by five cases compared 
to the previous year.3  
 
While the beneficiary or Member State may object to a recovery decision, the 
perspective of the beneficiary is not strongly emphasised in the state aid 
control system. A defence of recovery process requires “the patience of Job” 
and “deep pockets.”4 
 
Defence of recovery is an extreme measure; a last resort. A majority of the 
aid payments do follow proper procedure.5 Modern state aid regulation has, 
and is, systematically aimed at reducing the number of cases which may be 
the subject of a recovery decision. This is achieved by reducing the number 
of cases which must comply with the regular notification procedure.6  
 
A diligent businessman, who wants to understand the probability of him 
enjoying the benefit of state aid, will not be fully informed by reading this 
thesis. The scope of the thesis is restricted to an analysis of defence of 
recovery, which is only a limited piece of the system. 
 
                                                 
1 Hettne, Jörgen, Public Services and State Aid – is a Decentralisation of State Aid Policy 
Necessary? Last accessed 1 November 2013. 
http://sieps.se/sites/default/files/2011_14epa_0.pdf 
2 Lever, Sir Jeremy. “EU State Aid Law – Not A Pretty Sight” 1 [2013] EStAL, p. 7. 
Notably, the article is based on a speech.  
3Buts, Caroline, Joris, Tony and Jegers. Marc. “State Aid Policy in the EU Member States”. 
2 [2013] EStAL, p. 331. 
4 Hancher, Leigh, Ottervanger, Tom, Slot, Piet Jan. EU State Aids. 4th ed, London, 2012. 
The quotes, p. 12; remaining information p19.  
5 80% of the aid is granted through schemes or through block-exempted measures. 
SPEECH/12/424 Alumnia, Joaquín ”The State Aid Moderrnisation Initiative” 07/06/2012. 
(SPEECH/12/424) 
6 See chapter 2.4 Evolution of enforcement . 
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The aim of this thesis is to identify, describe and analyse the jurisprudence of 
defence of recovery in order to provide a de lege ferenda analysis of how the 
state aid system may be reformed. Ideally, any reform will increase the 
protection and standing of the beneficiary while the functioning of the internal 
market will remain intact.  
 
1.2 Research question and purpose 
Whereas the state aid control system in general, and the Commission in 
particular, take the Internal market and the perspective of the Member State 
into consideration, what often is ignored is the perspective of the beneficiary. 
The analysis is conducted with the perspective of the beneficiary, the 
hopefully diligent businessman, in mind. The purpose is to argue for the 
beneficiary and investigate to what extent the jurisprudence of defence of 
recovery may be changed, to the benefit of the beneficiary, without impairing 
the efficiency of the internal market.  
 
The research question is: 
While protecting the functioning of the Internal market and while acting 
within the limits of the general state aid control system, how may the defence 
of state aid recovery be adjusted to the benefit of the beneficiary? 
 
The purpose is not to suggest to revolutionise the jurisprudence of recovery 
but to adhere to largely the same assessments currently embraced by the Court 
but with increased emphasis on the interest of the beneficiary. State aid 
control should indeed protect the Internal market but such protection can be 
achieved through employing a variety of measures. The protection of the 
Internal market may be achieved through other measures than by adhering to 
the current interpretation of defence of recovery. 
 
In this thesis the current jurisprudence and development, including analogies 
with adjacent legal areas, is analysed in order to provide an answer to the 
research question. To identify which reforms may be made, to the benefit of 
the Internal market and the beneficiary alike, the aim of recovery as well as 
the strength of the current Internal market is identified in the analysis. 
 
1.3 Delimitation  
The focus of the thesis is state aid regulation at Union level, it does therefore 
not cover national law with any detail. The recovery of state aid is, however, 
a shared responsibility, thus it follows that the national law cannot be 
completely ignored.  
 
Nor is the very definition of state aid the subject of this thesis. The question 
of a measure’s status as state aid is dealt with in other parts of the state aid 
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system. Any defence of recovery of state aid requires that the measure has 
been defined as state aid. 
 
Not all principles of Union law and not all aspects of the recovery process are 
covered. The right to be heard, a duty to motivate decisions and right to a fair 
trial are examples of issues which are not elaborated on in great detail since 
those issues must be discussed in a context of human and procedural rights 
law. While they are of course relevant to the beneficiary, the focus of this 
thesis is aspects and principles deriving from Internal market and competition 
law.  
1.4 Method and litterature 
The de lege lata analysis is based on the traditional legal dogmatic method, 
which consists of analysing the state of the legal area through studying 
recognised legal sources.  
 
Considering that the focus of the thesis is Union law, the emphasis is to 
analyse relevant primary and secondary Union sources in addition to official 
documents on the interpretation and application of EU law, issued by the EU 
institutions. In addition to relevant court cases, decisions of the Commission 
are analysed. The Commission is the primary authority in competition law.  
 
A variety of academic literature and articles have been useful when analysing 
the interpretation of different sources of law. In addition, a blog post by a 
prominent author is included in the material.  
1.5 Terminology 
Unlawful aid refers to aid issued in breach of the standstill obligation set out 
in Article 108(3) TFEU, whereas incompatible aid is aid that is paid out in 
breach of the material law, as defined by Article 107. 
 
The notion of a beneficiary is the undertaking that receives the benefit of the 
aid. The recipient is the undertaking whom receives the aid initially. 
Normally, the two are the same. 
 
In the Treaty, state aid law is a section of competition law. However, they are 
often treated as separate legal areas. For the purpose of this thesis Articles 
101-109 TFEU, which include but is not limited to state aid law, are referred 
to as general competition law. Issues subject to Articles 101-102 are 
categorised as classic competition law.  
 
The Lisbon Treaty, in force as of December 1, 2009, changed the numbering 
in the treaty, as well as the names of some key concepts. Throughout this 
thesis, the numbering will follow the Lisbon system consistently. The 
Common market is referred to as the modern Internal market, and the former 
Court of First Instance is renamed the General Court. 
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1.6 Outline 
In accordance with convention, the first chapter introduces the thesis, its 
purpose and its methodology. The second chapter outlines the legal context.  
It includes primary and secondary law, policy documents and to some extent, 
the history of state aid recovery. Throughout the thesis, facts and statistics of 
state aid cases and recovery rate are included when appropriate.  
 
The first part of the de legel ferenda, Chapter 3-5, presents the case law of 
and academic discussion of the three recognised exemptions to the obligation 
to recover. The sections which cover national procedural autonomy and 
proportionality do to some extent include analysis in order to provide context 
to the facts. Since interim measures are becoming increasingly important, its 
case law is presented in conjunction with the exemption of ‘absolutely 
impossible’ in Chapter 4.  
 
In this thesis, the interests of the beneficiary and of the Member State are not 
automatically the same. In situations in which the beneficiary cannot be its 
own advocate, such as procedures of ‘absolutely impossible’, for the purpose 
of this thesis, the Member State is by necessity regarded as a representative 
of the beneficiary’s interest.  
 
To be able to learn from similar legal areas, Chapter 6 presents carefully 
selected analogies from EU funds law, classic competition law and Internal 
market law.  
 
Recovery shall contribute to the overall goal of the state aid control system, 
the protection of the functioning of the Internal market, which is not a very 
specific, albeit vital, goal. To identify the specific aim of the recovery 
measure, Chapter 7 and 8 present and, to some extent, include an analysis of 
the jurisprudence of the recovery cases that fall outside of the three recognised 
exemptions. The types of procedures are transfer of assets, of shares or of the 
benefit; in addition to insolvency procedures and infringement procedures 
under Article 260(2) TFEU.  
 
The de lege lata section is concluded with a summary.  
 
The last chapter consists of an analysis of the jurisprudence and a de lege 
ferenda discussion.  
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2 Legal context  
2.1 Introduction 
State aid is not forbidden; it is accepted by the Union and is encouraged by 
its Member States. In the year 2011 the Member States spend Euro 64 billion, 
equal to 0,5% of the GDP, on state aid.7 Any aid must, however, adhere to the 
substantive and procedural law. A state aid measure in breach of the 
procedural law, defined in Article 108 TFEU, is unlawful; aid which is in 
breach of the substantive law of Article 107 TFEU is incompatible.  
 
The purpose of state aid control is to “ensure that the level-playing field in 
the Internal market is maintained”8. The control shall ensure that the state 
intervention is kept to a minimum and prevent distortion of the competition. 
Competition is measured by dual parameters: competition between 
undertakings9 and competition among Member States10.  
 
Flawed competition between Member States damages the internal market. 
State aid is under strict supranational control, governed by a principle which 
can be described as a version of the principle of subsidiarity. The principle of 
subsidiarity is not applicable in competition law, since it is an area of 
exclusive Union competence. The image serves, however, as a useful frame 
of the academic discussion.  
 
The actions of the Member State may result in a negative spill over on the 
Internal market, thus supranational rules are required. State aid policy is 
heavily supervised by the Commission out of fear of “beggar thy neighbour”11 
policies and a fear of that the special interests may influence the states’ 
subsidy policy.12 A detailed description of the applicable law follows. 
2.2 Substantive law and procedural law 
Article 107 TFEU defines the notion of state aid. The criteria are 
cumulative.13 For the purpose of state aid control, the notion of “a Member 
state” refers to any public authority or body appointed by the state which is a 
part of state resources. The term “any aid” is given an extensive interpretation, 
broader than subsidy and it extends to a reduction of financial burden. Aid is 
                                                 
7 Buts, Joris, and Jegers. 2013, p 331, fn 14. 
8 Commission Notice Towards an effective implementation of Commission decision 
ordering Member States to recover unlawful and incompatible State Aid, 2007/C 272/05, 
OJ C272 15.11.2007, para. 13. (Recovery Notice) 
9 Hancher, Ottervanger, Slot. 4th ed, 2012, p. 32. 
10 De Cecco, Francesco. State Aid and the European economic constitution. Oxford, 2013, 
p. 42. 
11 Hancher, Ottervanger, Slot. 4th ed, 2012, p.32. 
12 Hancher, Ottervanger, Slot. 4th ed, 2012, p.33. 
13 Case C-280/00 Altmark [2003] ECR I-7747, para. 74. 
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the granting of a selective advantage ”in any form whatsoever”14 and must, 
by definition, distort competition and affect trade. Article 107(1) refers to the 
effect and not the intention of the measure. 
 
State aid is not necessarily incompatible with the Internal market, the 
prohibition of aid is “neither absolute nor unconditional”15. Article 107(2) 
TFEU sets out categories of aid that are compatible with the Internal market. 
Article 107(3) identifies categories that may be considered compatible. 
 
The Treaty has given the Commission a great margin of discretion in the area 
of competition. It has the “exclusive authority” to rule on the “compatibility 
or incompatibility” 16 of state aid. The Commission, in a two-step procedure, 
carries out the compatibility assessment. The first step is a preliminary 
assessment: in case the Commission finds that the measure is not aid or that 
it is compatible, its final decision will be to that effect. If not, it will proceed 
with the formal investigation procedure, which is an extensive investigation. 
The Commission and the Member States are the parties of that process.17  
 
Article 108 TFEU regulates the procedural law. New aid has to be notified to 
the Commission, which assesses its compatibility with the Internal market. 
Notably, the Member State, not the recipient, notifies the aid to the 
Commission.18  
 
The standstill obligation, in Article 108(3) TFEU, sets out an obligation on 
the Member States not to implement any aid measures without prior 
authorisation from the Commission. The obligation in Article 108(3) does 
have direct effect. The purpose of the notification system is to allow the 
Commission to perform a compatibility assessment.19 
 
There are exemptions to the notification requirement. In accordance with the 
Ferring-judgement, Services of General Economic Interest escape the aid 
criteria and hence the obligation to notify. 20 Additional notable examples are 
the block exemptions. Measures within the orbit of the General Block 
Exemption Regulation are considered not to disturb the Internal market. They 
do not fall under the standstill obligation, as defined by Article 108(3) TFEU. 
Thus, they do not have to be notified but the Member States are under an 
obligation to report them to the Commission.21  
                                                 
14 Heidenhain, Martin.. European State Aid Law: Handbook. München 2010, p. 14. 
15 Case C-39/94 Syndicat francais de l’Express international(SFEI) v La Poste [1996] ECR 
I-3547, para. 36. 
16 Heidenhain, 2010, p. 3. 
17Art. 4 -6 Council Regulation (EC) 659/1999 laying down detailed rules for the application 
of Article 93 of the EC Treaty. (Procedural Regulation) 
18Art. 2.1 Procedural Regulation. 
19 Köhler, Martin “Residex” 1[2013] EStAL p. 99. 
20 Case C-53/00 Ferring [2001] E.C.R. I-9067. 
21 Art. 3 Commission Regulation (EC) No.800/2008 of August 6, 2008 declaring certain 
categories of aid compatible with the common market in application of Arts. 87 and 88 of 
the Treaty. (General Block Exemption Regulation 800/2008). 
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2.3 The enforcement  
2.3.1 Obligation to recover  
Aid that is notified and compatible requires no further action. In the event of 
the aid not being notified nor compatible, the Commission must order the 
national authorities to retrieve the aid, illustrated in Figure 1.22 In a situation 
where the aid is not notified but is later deemed compatible with the Internal 
market, the newly identified compatibility does not cancel the initial 
unlawfulness. The criteria are mutually exclusive. 
 
The Commission will not order a full recovery of any state aid measure which 
is unlawful but compatible. In accordance with the CELF v SIDE I case, the 
Commission only requests that the beneficiary pay interest, which is 
illustrated in Figure 1. The national authorities may recover the full amount, 
if the course of action is in accordance with national law.23 
                                        Figure 1. 
 
 
    
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Commission reviews all existing aid and can reassess aid that is lawful 
and compatible. If the Commission, in its new assessment, finds the aid 
incompatible, the Commission cannot order a retrieval of the aid already paid 
out but the Member State cannot provide any additional aid, illustrated in 
upper right corner of Figure 1.24  
2.3.2 Available defences and procedures 
Member States and beneficiaries can object to a recovery order. The Recovery 
Notice acknowledges three exemptions to the obligation to retrieve aid: that 
a recovery is contradictory to the principles of Union law, ten years has passed 
                                                 
22 Art. 14 Procedural Regulation. 
23 Case C-199/06 Centre déxportion du Livre Francais (CELF) v Societe Internationale de 
Diffusion et d’Edition (SIDE) [2008] ECR I- 469, para. 55.;  
Commission Notice on the Enforcement of State Aid Law by National Courts OJ C85 p01 
.9.4.2009, para. 34-35. (Enforcement Notice) 
24 Art. 17-19 Procedural Regulation. 
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since the aid was granted and a recovery is absolutely impossible.25 The 
objector may choose to take advantage of any of the following procedures. 
 
The objector may take action during the incompatibility assessment. The 
Commission may hear arguments from the beneficiary but only the 
Commission and the Member States can be parties. The recipient of the aid is 
merely an interested party, with a right to submit comments.26 In the 
compatibility assessment, the Commission shall ex officio assess the risk of 
breaching a Union principle in the recovery decision.27 
 
An action for annulment may be brought in front of the Community courts, 
in accordance with Article 263 TFEU.  
 
A legal process in a national court may provide further judicial protection, 
particularly if it includes a preliminary ruling.28 The national courts execute the 
recovery decision. It is for the national court to assess the circumstances in the 
individual case, although it may be necessary to seek guidance through a 
preliminary ruling as defined in Article 267 TFEU. The national court may ask 
for the opinion of the Commission.29  
 
A regular infringement procedure, formally set out in Article 258 TFEU, is not 
initiated by the objector but it is an opportunity to present its arguments. If the 
Member State fails to comply with the judgment, it is open to the Commission 
to initiate action under Article 260, in which process the Member State may 
defend itself.  
 
Not all aspects of a recovery decision can be challenged effectively. The 
Commission holds a broad scope of discretion when implementing and 
enforcing competition law policies.30 Notably, any assessment of whether the 
size of the sum to be recovered is proportionate, would have to include a 
complex economic assessment. In matters of complex economic assessments, 
the Court cannot substitute its own economic assessments for those of the 
Commission’s. The Court can only perform a limited judicial review. 31 
 
The main legal processes are outlined above. When relevant, this thesis may 
include cases subject to other articles, for instance action under Article 340 
TFEU.  
                                                 
25 Recovery Notice, para. 18. 
26 Art. 6 Procedural Regulation. 
27 Art. 14.1 Procedural Regulation. 
28 Art. 267 TFEU. 
29 Enforcement Notice, section 3. 
30 Tridimas, Takis. The General Principles of EU Law. Oxford, 2nd ed, 2006,  p. 174. 
31 Joined cases T-132/96 and T-143/96 Freistaat Sachsen, Volkswagen AG and Volkswagen 
Sachsen GmbH v Commission [1999] ECR II-3663,  para. 6.  
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2.4 Evolution of enforcement  
2.4.1 Introduction to the history of enforcement 
Recovery is the primary remedy in state aid law, the Commission conducts 
the compatibility assessment and makes a decision. The Court confirmed the 
Commission’s ability to order recovery in 1972 and yet, the efficiency of the 
system could be questioned.32 The 1960s were characterised by a subsidy war. 
The financial crisis of the 1970s and 1980s left the Commission paralysed. 
During the 1980s, the Member States’ unwillingness to adhere to the 
procedural rules caused “frustration”33. 
 
The first phase of modernisation took place during the 1990s. The Court 
expanded the definition of state aid, which widened the jurisdiction of the 
Commission. In late 1990s, the Council issued the Procedural Regulation 
giving the Member States and the Commission “a comprehensive corpus of 
rules”34 allowing both parties to know what is expected of them in the 
recovery process.  
 
To strengthen the state aid control further, the Commission launched two 
ambitious projects: the State Aid Action Plan 2005-2009 and the State Aid 
Modernisation, hereafter referred to as SAAP and SAM respectively. 35 As is 
explained in the subsequent sections, neither the SAAP or SAM are detailed 
pieces of regulation. Both are policy documents laying out the aims and the 
structure of the future reforms of state aid control.  
 
The SAAP is a result of the Commission’s frustration over lack of authority 
and it is framed as a consultation document. It is at once “a conscious attempt 
at reform and a wish list”36 which lays out four major aims. 
 
The SAM is a selective continuation and improvement of SAAP. Here 
follows a short summary of the aims of each plan and some of the most 
relevant results achieved during each project. 
2.4.2 The State Aid Action Plan 2005-2009 
The first aim is to achieve less and better targeted aid.37 This is the paramount 
rationale of the plan: the Union shall simply spend less money on aid. Any 
                                                 
32 Case 70/72 Comisison v Germany [1973] E.C.R 813, para. 13. 
33 Szyszczak, Erika. Research Handbook on European State Aid Law, Cheltenham 2011, p. 
6.  
34 Szyszczak, 2011, p. 8. 
35 COM(2005)107 final Commission State Aid Action Plan – Less and better targeted state 
aid: a roadmap for state aid reform 2005-2009. 7.6. 2005. (SAAP).  
COM(2012)209 final, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, 
the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the 
regions EU State Aid Modernisation 8.5.2012. (SAM) .  
36 Szyszczak, 2011,p.10.  
37 SAAP, para. 18. 
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aid that is granted shall contribute to the goals set out by the Union. To allow 
well-targeted aid to escape the notification obligation, the Commission has 
set up the General Block Exemption Regulation, hereafter referred to as 
GBER.38 The GBER collected and expanded the previously scattered 
multitudes of exemptions.39 Notably, the Commission estimates that 
approximately 40% of all GBER cases are “potentially problematic” 40. 
 
Actions taken under the SAAP resulted in alterations of the de minimis 
Regulation. Measures which fall under the de minimis threshold are not 
subject to the notification obligation. In 2006, the Commisison raised the 
threshold by EUR 100 000 to 200 000.41 The new de minimis Regulation of 
2013 does not include a further increase of the threshold.42 
 
The second aim is to implement a refined economic approach.43 The 
Commission assesses the compatibility of the measure, in accordance with 
the approach. Expressed in quite simple terms, the approach identifies 
whether the aid contributes to or disturbs the Internal market. It is an effects-
based approach. Notably, the approach is applied in a compatibility 
assessment but it is not used to determine the sum to be recovered.44  
 
The third and fourth aims are the creation of procedures that are more 
effective and in addition, a shared responsibility between Member States and 
the Commission.45 To remedy some of the procedural inefficiency, the 
Commission has created a special recovery unit. Further, the Member States 
are to take a greater responsibility. To provide guidance to the Member States, 
the Commission has issued several notices such as the Enforcement Notice46. 
 
Another example of a notice is the Recovery Notice, which clarifies the 
principles regulating recovery. 47 With it, the states are given the right to ask 
the Commission for advice on state aid issues.48 In addition, the Commission 
has published a notice on Simplified Procedure for Certain types of State 
Aid49 laying out a simplified notification procedures for measures that are 
                                                 
38 General Block Exemption Regulation 800/2008. 
39 Szyszczak, 2011, p.13. 
40 SPEECH/12/424 
41 Art. 2.2 Commission Regulation  (EC)No 1998/2006 of December,15 2006 on the 
application of Articles 87 and 88 of the Treaty to de minimis aid. OJ L379 p5, 28.12.2006. 
(De minimis Regulation 1998/2006) 
Commission Regulation (EC) No 69/2001 of  January 12, 2001 on the Application of 
Article 87 and 88 of the EC Treaty to de minimis aid, OJ L10, p. 30. 13.1.2001 (De 
minimis Regulation 69/2001) 
42  The ceiling remain intact in the new Commission Regulation (EC) No XXX/2013 of 18 
Dec 2013 n.y.r (De minimis Regulation  XXX/2013). 
43 SAAP, para. 18. 
44 Hancher, Ottervanger, Slot. 4th ed, 2012, pp. 40-41. 
45 SAAP, para. 18. 
46 Enforcement Notice. 
47 Recovery Notice. 
48 Recovery Notice, para. 80. 
49 Notice from the Commission on a simplified procedure for treatment of certain types of 
State Aid OJ C 136 p03 16.6.2009. (Simplified Notice) 
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most probably compatible. To a great extent, the notices are codifications of 
existing case law but since they do provide clarity, they are making the 
enforcement more efficient. 
2.4.3 State Aid Modernisation 2012  
The State Aid Modernisation set out to achieve three goals. 50 First, to foster 
sustainable, smart and inclusive growth in a competitive Internal market. The 
modernisation seeks to reconcile the role of targeted public spending and the 
task of generating growth, with the need to bring state budgets under control.  
 
Second, to refocus the Commission’s ex ante scrutiny on cases with the 
greatest impact on the Internal market, whilst strengthening the Member 
States cooperation in state aid enforcement. The result is few concrete actions 
but one suggestion has materialised. The Commission proposes that not all 
complaints must result in a formal decision. The Commission would like to 
be able to prioritise the significant cases, which would free up Commission 
resources. 
 
The last aim is to streamline the rules and provide for faster decisions. A 
complex legal framework governs the state aid. With SAM, the Commission 
wishes to provide a better understanding of the notion of state aid. The exact 
format of such a clarification is not yet determined.  
2.4.4 The financial crisis 
It is important to look at the development and restructuring of EU state aid 
recovery policy over the last decade, which includes changes caused by the 
financial crisis. With the collapse of the bank Lehman Brothers in 2008, 
Europe fell into a financial crisis. The severity of the financial situation was 
grave enough to activate the application of Article 107(3)b TFEU.  
 
In response to the crisis, the Commission issued the Banking Communication, 
a part of the provisional state aid regulation. the financial sector.51 It stated 
the Commission shall execute a compatibility assessment within 24 hours, or 
over a weekend.52 Despite the turbulence, the Commission managed to 
maintain the state aid discipline of the Treaty.53 Significant portions of the 
provisional framework are no longer applicable.  
                                                 
50SAM, para. 8 and 14.  
51 Commission Communication on the application of State aid rules to measures taken in 
relation to financial institutions in the context of the current global financial crisis, OJ  C 
270 p. 8. 2008. (Banking Communication) 
52 Banking Communication, para. 53.  
53 Hancher, Ottervanger, Slot. 4th ed, 2012, p. 26. 
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3 Defence 1: in breach of Union 
principles 
3.1 Introduction to Union principles 
One exemption from the obligation to order a recovery is a situation in which 
a recovery would contravene general principles of Union law. Which are the 
principles of Union law? Depending on the criterion used, it is possible to 
identify a plethora of principles. In this thesis only a selected few of the 
principles, all of which are discussed in state aid cases and decisions, are 
explored in detail.  
 
This chapter primarily concentrates on principles that have an effect on the 
state aid case law and academic discussion. Certain principles are included 
since the principle has been used to argue at least one defence case 
successfully. Others are chosen because they are at the heart of an interesting 
academic debate. Both categories contribute to identify the current state of 
defence of recovery jurisprudence.  
 
As a pedagogical note, the two concepts of condictio indebiti and good faith 
are useful to keep in mind throughout the thesis. Naturally, recovery of state 
aid is not based on the same principles and legal methods as condictio indebiti 
or good faith but the imagery may nevertheless facilitate a deeper 
understanding of the subject matter. 
 
The norm is to recover incompatible aid. Beneficiaries of aid which is only 
unlawful but not incompatible are subjected to a payment of interest. To 
decide not to recover incompatible aid is a derogation and as any derogation, 
in accordance with Union principles, it must be interpreted narrowly.54  
 
3.2 Meet the diligent businessman  
Throughout the case law, the courts are referring to a diligent businessman. 
The diligent businessman is a theoretical person which serves as a benchmark 
as to what level of knowledge and understanding of Union law the EUCJ 
expects a businessman to have. A businessman not living up to the courts’ 
standards may not, at least not successfully, claim the protection of the 
principles of good faith or legitimate expectations.  
 
The courts do not provide any evidence that the diligent businessman is, by 
any standards, an accurate representation of those businessmen operating in 
                                                 
54 Winckler, Antoine and Laprévote, Francois-Charles “Reconciling Legal Certainty, 
Legitimate Expectations, Equal Treatment and the Prohibition of State Aids” 2[2011] 
EStAL p. 324. 
 17 
the Union, nor that the expectations the courts put upon him are realistic. The 
level of knowledge which the courts claim a diligent businessman should 
have is simply the level of knowledge the EUCJ wants any businessman to 
have.55 
3.3 The principle of legal certainty 
In affinity with the rule of law and as a fundamental principle of the Union 
law, legal certainty expresses that the “subject to the law must know what the 
law is so as to be able to plan their actions accordingly”56. The subjects of the 
law must be able to predict the content of the law and the subjects must be 
allowed to be able to foresee the nature of, and changes of, relationships 
governed by Union law. 
 
The principle of legal certainty cannot be explained without referring to the 
principle of legitimate expectations. Within state aid law, the beneficiary may 
present arguments based on the principle of legal certainty and treat it as an 
independent principle but arguments are frequently based on a combination 
of the two principles legal certainty and legitimate expectations. 
 
The principle of legal certainty does share similarities with legitimate 
expectations. As a result, the Court does not necessarily distinguish between 
the two principles. The Court often interprets legitimate expectation as a 
“specific expression”57 of legal certainty. This section concentrates primarily 
on the latter category and its interpretation, as an isolated and independent 
principle, separate from the principle of legitimate expectations.  
 
In the specific context of defence of recovery of state aid, legal certainty 
requires Union actions to be sufficiently clear, precise and predictable.58 The 
Commission’s decisions are not always clear and precise. A concerned party 
may present arguments in favour of an annulment of the recovery decision 
due to that the decision is lacking sufficient clarity, based on the principle of 
legal certainty. 
 
The recovery process is governed by a system of bilateral character. The 
Commission assesses the compatibility of an aid measure and makes a 
decision on whether to recover or not. In its decision, the Commission must 
provide a method which could be used by the national authorities to identify 
whom to recover from and provide a method as to how to calculate the amount 
to be retrieved. The national court performs the final calculations and the 
identification of the actual beneficiary. It is not within the jurisdiction of the 
Commission to execute the recovery decision. Additionally the Member state 
often have more information. Thus, the Commission does not have to identify 
the exact amount to be retrieved or even define who the beneficiary is.  
                                                 
55 Petzold, Hans Arno “Judgment of the Court of European Union in C-210/09 Scott and 
Kimberly Clark”, 1[2011] EStAL, p. 90. 
56 Tridimas, 2006, p. 241. 
57 Tridimas, 2006, p. 242. 
58 Dilley, James “Comments on the France Télécom Case”,4[2012 ] EStAL, p. 916.  
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Union legislation and principles do not allow the Commission to issue 
decisions that are not sufficiently specific. An unclear decision is a breach of 
the principle of legal certainty. As stated above, in its decision the 
Commission does not have to deliver the exact number or the exact 
undertaking. The decision must only “delimit the range within which the final 
amount” is “to be established” 59. The information is sufficiently clear and 
specific if it enables the national authority “without too much difficulty” 60 to 
determine the amount of aid to retrieve. 
 
If a Member State fails to provide the Commission with the information 
required to form a well-founded and clear decision, the Court accepts that the 
Commission makes a decision that is less clear. Within certain limits, the 
Commission is allowed to formulate a decision of a clarity and quality that 
reflects the quality and clarity of the information. To sum up, non-exact 
information renders a non-exact method of calculation.61  
 
As seen above, the level of uncertainty tolerated does have limits. So far, the 
case law has not provided a clear indication as to where these limits are drawn. 
The case Commission v Salzgitter clarifies the difficulty of identifying that 
line.62 Its chronology is as follows. The Commission issued a recovery 
decision. The General Court annulled the decision, due to a breach of legal 
certainty. The Court set aside the judgement of the General Court and referred 
the case back to the General Court. In its final decision, the General Court 
denied the beneficiaries’ application to annul the decision. 
 
This paragraph seeks to examine in more detail the reasoning of the General 
Court’s first decision, in which it annulled the Commission’s decision.63 
According to the General Court, the Commission’s decision lacked clarity. 
The Commission did not, despite having sufficient information to do so, 
object to a prolongation of the aid. The Commission did later decide to object 
but the objection was merely implied and the initial non-objection decision 
was only partly withdrawn. The General Court obligated the Commission to 
clarify the situation before ordering a recovery. 64 
 
To further continue the above case, this paragraph intends to examine the 
reasoning of the General Court’s second decision, in which the court decides 
to not annul the Commission’s decision. The reasons are as follows. Germany 
did not notify the aid to the Commission, despite being obliged to do so. 
Granted the Union is partly to blame, since it had allowed a certain amount 
of time to elapse before making a decision, but the length of the time the 
Commission took to make a decision is not alarming. The Commission can 
                                                 
59 Case C-81/10 P France Télécom v Commission n.y.r, para. 101.  
60 Case C-81/10 P France Télécom v Commission n.y.r, para. 101. 
61 Case C-81/10 P France Télécom v Commission n.y.r, para. 101-102.  
62 Case C-408/04 P Commission v Salzgitter [2008] ECR. I-2767, para. 99.  
63 Case T-308/00 Salzgitter AG v Commisison [2004] ECR II-1933, para. 174-180. 
64 Tridimas, 2006, p. 295. 
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“not delay indefinitely the exercise of its powers”65. Thus the beneficiary 
failed to prove that the Union had breached the principle of legal certainty.66  
 
As another example, the Commission applies the principle of legal certainty 
in a decision about a French tax scheme.67 According to the Commission, 
some beneficiaries under the scheme were misled to believe the aid was 
lawful.68 Additionally, the Commission has delayed exercising its powers to 
examine the scheme, rendering exceptional circumstances, which constitute 
a breach of the principle of legal certainty. 69  
3.4 Principle of legitimate expectations 
3.4.1 The central principle  
Legitimate expectation is often argued in tandem with other principles, often 
legal certainty, good administration and equal treatment. Where several 
principles are argued together with legitimate expectation, not all of the 
principles are presented separately, rather they will be presented in 
conjunction with the principle of legitimate expectations.  
 
Notably, the principle of legitimate expectations has received far more space 
in this thesis than the other principles. Since it is the most often argued 
principle, the space allocation is proportionate. This section discusses the 
application of the principle, its definition and how it is argued.  
 
Member States and private beneficiaries have different opportunities and 
ability to successfully argue legitimate expectations. A Member State may 
not invoke legitimate expectations on behalf of the recipient. This is to 
prevent the Member States from relying on their own unlawful actions.70 The 
rules do not completely exclude a situation in which a Member state 
successfully argue legitimate expectations. It will only happen, however, if 
the Union institutions created an expectation with the Member State itself, 
and not the beneficiary.  
 
Consequently, the burden of invoking legitimate expectations falls entirely 
upon the beneficiary undertaking. In contrast to a Member State, the 
beneficiary may plead legitimate expectations. As a rule, however, the 
argumentation is not successful, not for the beneficiary nor for the Member 
State.71  
                                                 
65 Case T-308/00 RENV Salzgitter AG v Commisison n.y.r,, para. 67. 
66 Case T-308/00 RENV Salzgitter AG v Commisison n.y.r,, para. 34 and 45-46.  
67 C(2006) 6629 Commission decision of 20 December 2006 on the aid scheme 
implemented by France under Article 39 CA of the General Tax Code - State aid  C46/2004  
(ex NN 64/2004)08, CP 244/07)  OJ L 112  p41. 30.4.2007. (C(2006) 6629)).; Heidenhain, 
2010, p. 646.  
68 C(2006) 6629The Swedish version reads: “avsiktligt vilseletts” para. 188.  
69 C(2006) 6629, para. 188 and 194. 
70 Case C-5/89 Commission v Germany [1990] ECR I-3437, para. 17. 
71 Tridimas, 2006, pp. 293-295. 
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In principle, the beneficiaries cannot enjoy the protection of the principle of 
legitimate expectations unless the aid is notified in accordance with proper 
procedure, which are laid down in Article 108(3) TFEU. Aid not notified to 
the Commission can later be deemed compatible or incompatible. In the event 
of the latter, the Member State must retrieve the aid from the recipient. A 
recovery is thus a foreseeable risk that the beneficiary, by accepting the not 
notified aid, has agreed to endure. 72  
 
A diligent businessman should, according to the Union, be able to determine 
whether the state has observed proper state aid notification procedures. 73 The 
formal system defined by Article 108(3) TFEU is more than merely a simple 
procedural rule. The standstill obligation does not serve the purpose of 
safeguarding the interest of private competitors but rather, it primarily serves 
the purpose of securing the Commission’s competence to asses new aid.74 
 
Normally, proper notification of the aid is a prerequisite of holding legitimate 
expectations. There are however, instances where the expectation may be 
recognised as legitimate, despite the lack of any notification. The proof is in 
the fact that EUCJ examines the possibility to apply legitimate expectations. 
Since lawful aid cannot be recovered; if unlawful aid could not be protected 
from recovery by legitimate expectation, contemplating to invoke the 
principle in a potential recovery situation would be redundant. Assuming the 
courts do not waste their time, it cannot be excluded that the principle can be 
used to protect unlawful aid from recovery. Its role must however be limited 
to exceptional circumstances.75 
 
To explain in which situations a beneficiary may hold legitimate expectations, 
the concept of good faith is a useful allegory. Similar to the concept of good 
faith, legitimate expectations is not concerned with subjective faith. The law 
pays attention to what the buyer should have known, ignoring what the buyer 
did in fact know. In state aid recovery, legitimate expectations are not based 
on what the beneficiary de facto knows but what the theoretical diligent 
businessman is expected to, in other words should, know.76 
 
As will be proven, Union measures must not violate the expectations which a 
reasonable person might hold, conditioned that the expectation is founded on 
the actions and behaviour of a relevant public authority. In situations where a 
change of a situation should have been foreseeable, the person may not hold 
a legitimate expectation. Further, an acknowledgement of the principle 
requires that there is no overriding matter of public interest preventing its 
application.77 
                                                 
72 Tridimas, 2006, p. 295. 
73 Heidenhain, 2010, p. 643.  
74 Köhler, 2013, p. 99. 
75 Heidenhain, 2010, p. 643. 
76 Case C-24/95 Alcan Deutschland v Commission [1997] E.C.R. I-1591, para. 25.  
77 Joined cases C-182/03 and C-217/03 Belgium and Forum 187 v Commission [2006] ECR 
I-5479, para. 147-148. 
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3.4.2 Legitimate Union sources 
A beneficiary can hold legitimate expectation only if the expectations derive 
from a Union source. However, not all Union actions are valid sources. This 
section covers which sources of Union actions that may create legitimate 
expectations.  
 
Certain Commission actions can be a valid source of expectations but not 
necessarily all Commission actions have the same legitimacy. Any 
suggestions from the Commission to a Member State during a state aid 
negotiation with the Commission are not a valid source of legitimate 
expectations. A decision by the Commission is, however, a legitimate 
source.78  
 
The Commission has jurisdiction to create soft law. The soft law is self-
binding for the Commission, when it makes decisions in individual cases. 
Such a piece of law may create legitimate expectations. If the Commission’s 
piece of soft law covers an area outside of the jurisdiction of the Commission, 
the soft law does not give rise to a legitimate expectation79. Equally, a Council 
action can have two different results. If it is of political nature, it is not 
considered as a valid source of legitimate expectations.80  
 
To be a valid source of legitimate expectation, the measure must be within 
the jurisdiction of the issuing body. The Commission and the national courts 
may interpret the notion of state aid in order to determine whether the 
standstill obligation is respected.81 The final interpretation of state aid is 
within the power of the Court. In SAM, the Commission clarifies it is intent 
to clarify the notion of state aid. If the Commission issues a communication 
on the subject of the definition of state aid, it is on “thin ice” 82 and may only 
cause confusion. 
 
The principle of legitimate expectation does not only protect a beneficiary. 
When applied together with the principle of equal treatment, it may serve to 
protect a third party from the combined actions of the beneficiary and the 
Union. In CIRF the Commission and the Member state agree upon a certain 
measure and in effect, upon a certain interpretation of the relevant rules.83  
The interpretation, which the decision is based upon, is not in accordance with 
established existing self-binding administrative regulations. Such an action is 
not compatible with the principle of legitimate expectations and equal 
treatment. A third party is entitled to receive an interpretation that is 
consistent and of a non-random manner. Hence, despite the fact that the two 
                                                 
78 Joined cases C-182/03 and C-217/03 Belgium and Forum 187 v Commission [2006] ECR 
I-5479, para. 153 and 155. 
79 Case 310/85 Deufil v Commission [1987] E.C.R. 901. 
80 Joined cases C-182/03 and C-217/03 Belgium and Forum 187 v Commission [2006] ECR 
I-5479, para. 150 and 152. 
81 Enforcement Notice, para. 10.  
82 Luja, Raymond “Does the Modernisation of State Aid Put Legal Certainty and Simplicity 
at Risk?” 4[2012] EStAL, p. 765. 
83 Case C-313/90 CIRFS v Commission [1993] E.C.R. I-1125, para. 32 and 45.  
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parties of the procedure agree, the decision is a breach of the principle of 
legitimate expectations. 84 
3.4.3 Ignorance: subjective good faith 
Legitimate expectations must derive from the actions of the Union and the 
nature of the system. Several beneficiaries have argued that they simply had 
no knowledge of the structure of the state aid system. Specifically, they were 
unaware of that the Commission assess the compatibility of the aid. 
Insufficient knowledge of the control system and of the laws of state aid are 
not sources of legitimate expectations. Good faith is irrelevant. A difficulty 
to understand the situation does not result in legitimate expectations, nor does 
the fact that the company is small and has not received legal advice result in 
a kinder ruling.85 
3.4.4 Good faith 
The beneficiary can rely on the protection of the principle of legitimate 
expectations only if said businessman acts on the expectation. The 
Commission will not take merely theoretical scenarios into consideration 
when assessing if it is precluded from ordering a recovery. While that is 
arguably an unproblematic statement, particular assessment problems arise in 
the cases where the beneficiary is exposed to difficulties due to changes of 
the system or assessments of the nature of the state aid, changes that may be 
considered foreseeable. If the changes are, to a diligent businessman as the 
concept is defined by the Court, possible to predict, the argument to protect 
legitimate expectations has no bearing. This section seeks to investigate 
situations in which the beneficiary believes it acts in accordance with the rules 
applicable while, due to rapid changes of the control system, the opposite is 
true. 
 
Aid which is granted within the framework of a Swedish aid scheme is 
initially identified as existing aid. Notably, Member states are under no 
obligation to notify existing aid to the Commission. As a result, the 
beneficiary does not have to make sure the aid has been properly notified. 
Due to Union actions, the aid was no longer identified as existing aid. The 
Union failed to follow standard protocol, including to properly publish the 
decision. Nevertheless, the changed status of the aid is legally binding. 
Normally, such a decision is only legally binding following a publication. 
Since the change was not published, the beneficiary could not know that the 
status of the aid was altered, from existing to new. Thus, the beneficiaries 
have legitimate expectations of having received aid which has been notified 
and assessed in every way required. 86  
                                                 
84 Szyszczak, 2011, p. 374. 
85 Case T-55/99 CETM v Commission [2000] E.C.R. II-3207, para. 126.; Case T-109/01 
Fleuren Compost v Commission [2004] ECR II-0127, para. 140. 
86 C(2004) 2210 Commission decision of 30 June 2004 on the aid scheme implemented by 
Sweden for an exemption from the tax on energy from 1 January 2002 to 30 June 2004, OJ. 
L165 p.21 25.06.2005,para. 63.  
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3.4.5 Change is not foreseeable 
The very definition of state aid is not the topic of this thesis. The 
consequences of a changing definition of state aid, however, is. The 
Commission has consistently upheld the principle that “neither the lack of any 
precedent involving the application of the State aid rules in similar cases nor 
the alleged lack of clarity in Community policy on State aid”87 results in a 
legitimate expectation. It is a principle not without exceptions. 
 
An interpretation of a court case may render legitimate expectations, if it is 
formulated in a manner that leads the beneficiary “in good faith” to believe 
“that the national measures at issue before national court would cease to be 
selective, and therefore cease to constitute State aid”88. Since the beneficiary 
acts, or in this case does not act, in good faith, the Commission does not order 
a recovery of said measure. 
 
In the situation at hand, the Commission abstains from a recovery because 
that particular type of aid measure is examined for the first time. Since the 
situation is entirely new, a diligent businessman cannot understand that the 
state does not act correctly. 89 It is a line of reasoning which is supported by 
AG Jacobs and an argument, or at least the overriding principle of that 
argument, which the Court accepts. AG Jacobs argues that in cases where a 
measure does not “self-evidently” constitute state aid, a recovery can be 
“inappropriate”90.  
3.4.6 Time as an exceptional circumstance 
As previously stated, the existence of legitimate expectation normally 
requires proper notification but exemptions to that rule cannot be excluded. 
Extremely lengthy proceedings may result in such an exemption. If the aid is 
not notified in accordance with Article 108(3) TFEU, the Commission is not 
bound to deliver a decision within a set time frame. Despite the lack of formal 
time limits, the Commission is, however, not allowed to delay the exercise of 
its power indefinitely. This section presents the relevant case law.  
 
Case RSV is a seminal state aid case. It is possibly the only successful case 
which concerns not notified aid. As could be expected, the circumstances of 
the case are special. In the RSV case, the Commission waited 26 month before 
submitting a decision regarding the compatibility of the unlawful aid. In the 
judgment, despite the fact that the Procedural Regulation is silent on the 
                                                 
87 Heidenhain, 2010, p. 646.  
88 C(2004)325 Commission decision of 9 March 2004 on an aid scheme implemented by 
Austria for a refund from the energy taxes on natural gas and electricity in 2002 and 2003, 
O.J. L190 p.13 22.07.2005, para. 66.  
89 C(2004)3060 Commission decision of 2 August 2004 on the State Aid implemented by 
France for France Télécom, OJ. L 257 p11 20.9.2006, para. 263-264. (C(2004)3060).  
An application for annulment of the decision is pending.  
90 Case C-39/94 Syndicat francais de l’Express international(SFEI) v La Poste [1996] ECR 
I-3547, para. 70-71.; Opinion of AG Jacobs in C-39/94 Syndicat francais de l’Express 
international(SFEI) v La Poste, para. 76. 
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subject as to which length of time may be considered inappropriate, the Court 
raises objections. The Commission defends itself by claiming that the 
complexity of the situation warrants a lengthy decision period. 91 
 
In its judgment, the Court fails to see the complexity of the case, stating that 
the contested aid is a supplement to previously authorised aid, which would 
make the decision process a fairly simple one.92 The Court considers the 
action of the Commission to constitute exceptional circumstances and thus 
the beneficiary may rely on its legitimate expectations as of the aid’s 
compatibility. 
 
In contrast to the beneficiary of the RSV case, the undertaking in case CELF 
v SIDE II fails to prove it holds an expectation which is legitimate.93 Notably, 
in CELF v SIDE II, the time to reach a final decision on the compatibility of 
the aid, 20 years, is considerably longer than that of the RSV case.  
 
In CELF v SIDE II the parties utilise the judicial system of state aid control 
to its full potential. The process includes court annulments of three 
consecutive Commission decisions and in total, the case lasted over 20 years. 
In the case, the applicant argues that the repeatedly favourable decisions give 
rise to a legitimate expectation of the aid’s compatibility. While the Court 
agrees that it is a “very unusual situation”94 the complexity of the proceedings 
does not per se result in a legitimate expectation. If anything, the complicated 
nature of the case “should increase the recipient’s doubts as to the 
compatibility of the aid.”95  
 
Additionally, in each individual step of the process, the Court finds, normal 
procedures are followed. As concluded by the Court, time passing due to the 
procedural tie of the Union judicial system is not an exceptional circumstance.  
 
The level of cooperation on the part of the Member State is essential. If the 
Member State causes delays by not cooperating to satisfaction, the 
beneficiary may not hold legitimate expectations.96 Logically, the prolonged 
delay in RSV is a result of Union action and hence the case is a success. The 
length of the unsuccessful CELF v SIDE II -case is due to the very time-
consuming nature of the judicial system.  
 
A lengthy process may result in legitimate expectations. Theoretically, they 
may in addition be a breach of the principle of good administration. The Court 
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acknowledges that there are cases where the procedure is not followed to 
perfection. It does not, however, acknowledge that such cases are a breach of 
the principle good administration or that it may lead to an annulment of the 
decisions.97 In order to provide a context it may be noted that the General 
Court can take, on average, 48 months to issue a judgment in a fully contested 
case. Further appeal will usually take approximately another 18 months, a 
total of 66 months. In comparison, dumping cases take on average 18 months, 
competition cases may last up to 56 months.98  
3.4.7 Expectations must be reasonable 
To become legitimate, the expectation must be reasonable. The definition of 
the concept reasonable depends on the situation. A businessman cannot 
reasonably expect a piece of legislation never to change. As this section will 
show, expectations of transitional measures to ease the change may or may 
not be reasonable.  
 
In Belgium and Forum 187 v Commission the Court confirms that an 
expectation of transitional measures is reasonable. In the event the 
Commission changes its policy, the beneficiary shall enjoy some transitional 
measure99. In fact, the Commission has an obligation to provide transitional 
measures and they have to be adequate.100 In the case mentioned, the 
Commission provides a very short transition period, which does not give the 
beneficiary sufficient time or opportunity to adapt, and hence it is not in 
accordance with the beneficiaries’ reasonable expectations. 101  
 
Notably, the aid in Belgium and Forum 187 v Commission is initially 
considered not to be state aid. It is later deemed as state aid under Article 107 
TFEU. The transition from being considered as non-aid to state aid is 
arguably essential to the assessment of which expectations are reasonable. It 
has been suggested that in cases “where the Commission has taken a non-
objection, rather than a no-aid decision”102 the undertakings are less likely to 
be able to rely on legitimate expectations in a defence of a recovery process. 
In the case of a non-objection, the derogation from the normal system is 
greater. The following case illustrates that not all expectations of transitional 
measures are reasonable.  
 
In the subsequent case of Nuova Agricast and Cofra v Comission two 
companies complain about the transition from a 1997-1999 aid scheme to a 
2000-2006 aid scheme. Following a failed application under the 1997-1999 
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scheme, both undertakings withdrew their application, in order to be able to 
re-apply later.103 
 
No new opportunity, however, presented itself, as the scheme of 1997-1999 
provided no further call for applicants. In addition, the new scheme of 2000-
2006 was the subject of slightly stricter rules imposed by the Union. In the 
court process, the undertakings argued the importance of protecting their 
legitimate expectation, in this case to benefit from suitable transitional 
measures. 
 
The Court does not agree. No precise assurance has been given to them by 
any Union institution; there was no concrete promise that they would in fact 
be able to re-apply or that there would be a new call for applicants. A scheme 
is by definition limited in time and that limitation is public information. It is 
not reasonable to assume anything other than that a new scheme is guided by 
a new set of rules.104  
3.4.8 The individual’s interest must prevail  
In a proportionality assessment, the principle of legitimate expectations has 
to be balanced against the interest of the public. The interest of the individual 
has to prevail over the interest of the public. The courts rarely perform this 
proportionality assessment explicitly; often it is an implied exercise. P & O 
European Ferriesis is one of few cases where the balancing of the interest is 
easily identifiable. 105  
 
The public interest is not static as it varies with the changing aim of the Union 
measure evoking the expectations. Starting with the interest of the public, the 
General Court identifies the interest of third parties as a general interest. In 
the assessment of which interests shall prevail, the General Court emphasises 
that the competitors has a right to challenge positive decisions; not necessarily 
out of concern for the competitors. The main purpose appears to be to uphold 
the system of the review conducted by the Community judicatures in order to 
prevent “the operation of the market from being distorted by State aid”106.  
3.5 National procedural autonomy 
It is not within the Court’s jurisdiction to assess national law. It is however, 
within its duty to assess the scope and the interpretation of Union law. In a 
system of shared responsibility, national law and Union law will inevitable 
collide. The following section assesses how the national procedural autonomy 
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and the effectiveness of the state aid control system are balanced. To provide 
context, some of the arguments relevant to the academic debate are presented. 
 
Because of the direct effect of the standstill obligation and of the bilateral 
character of the recovery process, national courts find themselves under an 
obligation to apply national law and Union law simultaneously. A recovery 
shall be executed in accordance with the procedures under the national law of 
the Member State, provided said laws allow for an effective recovery.107  
 
Union law does not preclude the application of national law or principles but 
requires that the interest of the Union is taken into full consideration. The 
Court applies “selective deference”108. In case Alcan full respect of the Union 
principle of effectiveness requires that the national principle of legitimate 
expectation is left unapplied.109 Arguably, the Court is minimising the 
national autonomy, since such actions are beneficial to the interest of the 
Union.110 
 
The relationship between national law and Union law may appear confusing. 
This is largely because the same principles, in name, exist at national and 
Union level alike. They are, however, the same in name only and are in effect 
two different principles. Since one derives from national law and the other 
from Union law, they have two independent meanings and effects.  
 
Res judicata is an essential principle, acknowledged at Union level. The case 
Lucchini clarifies that res judicata, deriving from national law, does not allow 
Union rules to be left unapplied. Arguably, it could be concluded that the 
Court is prioritising the effectiveness of the system over the national 
procedural autonomy. 111  
 
Also, the case of Lucchini is arguably not about the conflict between national 
law and Union law but rather it is about the relationship of procedural law 
and substantive law. The Union law lacks procedural rules and hence, cannot 
interfere with national procedural autonomy. In the case, it is in fact 
jurisdiction and the principle of consistent interpretation which is discussed. 
Whereas a national court can execute a recovery, it cannot legitimate rule on 
the substantive law of the initial case, thus it lacks jurisdiction to create res 
judicata.112 
3.6 Proportionality 
Despite the lack of successful cases, the following section will discuss the 
possibility of increased nuance in the proportionality assessment. 
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Proportionality is a reoccurring argument and since it is simply a centerpiece 
of the Union legal principles, it should always be addressed.  
 
In regards to recovery of state aid, proportionality refers to whether the 
recovery causes more harm than the initial aid did. The means used to achieve 
the end must not be more invasive than what is necessary and appropriate. 
The proportionality of a measure is determined by the aim of the measure and 
of the significance of the aim. While a general aim of recovery is to ensure 
effectiveness and credibility of the system, a quite generic aim, the more 
precise purpose of a recovery remains “unclear”113.  
 
Unlawful and incompatible aid must be recovered in a flat recovery, which is 
when the sum to recover is the exact equivalent of the aid, with added 
interest.114 Beneficiaries have argued that the flat recover is not proportionate, 
since the amount to be recovered does not equal the competitive-advantage 
the beneficiary received. While the amount of aid, in pure monetary terms, 
“normally”115 corresponds to the competitive benefit of the recipient, that is 
however not always the case.  
 
Proportionality in recovery is not to be confused with proportionality when 
establishing the size of the aid. The latter “require different measures to be 
adopted /…/ to restore the situation prevailing prior to the payment of the 
unlawful aid”116. While different sums must be retrieved from different types 
of state aid actions, the sum does not vary on account of the individual effect 
it has on the competitive situation.  
 
The case law on proportionality, as it stands, is clear. The courts have 
consistently held that proportionality cannot stand in the way of recovery. The 
recovery of the aid “cannot in principle be regarded as disproportionate”117. 
Provided that the incompatibility of the aid is established, a recovery requires 
no further motivation. A recovery is simply “the logical consequence”118 of 
the aid’s illegality and incompatibility, and is not a penalty. 119 The state aid 
is not a reward nor a right, the aid is merely a benefit. 120  
 
It is established that the aid may have an effect beyond its pure monetary 
value. A Belgian study indicated that two years post the granting of the aid, 
the beneficiaries’ market shares had increased.121 Further, since the 
beneficiary must fulfill certain conditions in order to initially receive the aid 
the “face value”122 might greatly exceed the benefit of the recipient. The 
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recovery of the original sum of aid is a “poor proxy for anticompetitive effects 
caused by the aid”123. 
 
The fact that the harm caused by the recovery may exceed the mere reversal 
of the aid is of no interest to the courts. The claims of the beneficiary, in case 
CETM v Commission, that the magnitude of the harm caused by the recovery 
would greatly exceed the magnitude of the initial benefit produced by the aid, 
is dismissed on both facts and arguments.124 The General Court establishes 
that a recovery of the full amount of the initial aid is in accordance with the 
aim of case law of recovery. The Commission does not need to limit its 
decision to the amount that corresponds to the anti-competitive effect.  
 
In addition to the flat recovery, the beneficiary must pay interest. The interest 
may only “offset the financial advantages actually arising from the allocation 
of the aid to the recipient”125 and it is not an additional punishment. The 
definition of the financial advantage is clarified in CELF v SIDE I. The 
interest shall adjust for a difference in economic effect and the flat recovery. 
By not having to pay a commercial interest rate, the beneficiary receives an 
advantage and in addition, the aid leads to improvement of the competitive 
position relative the other competitors. The Member State must thus order the 
aid recipient to pay an interest in respect of the period of unlawfulness.126 
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4 Defence 2: absolutely 
impossible to recover 
4.1 The state’s defence 
The recovery process is a shared responsibility between the Commission and 
the Member States. The Commission’s task is to assess the compatibility and 
order the recovery. The national authorities are responsible for identifying the 
aid and the execution of the recovery. A recovery is not optional; the Member 
States are under obligation to carry out the recovery in an efficient manner.127  
 
History shows that the Member States have been reluctant to execute recovery 
decisions to satisfaction. In June 2006, out of all recovery decisions adopted 
in 2000-2001, 45% had not been implemented properly.128 The amount of 
not-refunded unlawful and incompatible aid had increased from 11,1% year 
2010, to 14,4% in 2012.129  
 
The state aid control system recognises three legitimate defences against 
recovery: a recovery is in breach of Union principles, the ten-year prescription 
period has expired and that a recovery is absolutely impossible to execute. 
The latter is the Member State’s defence. In principle, a Member State cannot 
claim legitimate expectations; where the Member State fails to recover, the 
only legitimate excuse is that a recovery is absolutely impossible.130 
 
In accordance with Union rules, no one can be obligated to do the impossible, 
impossibilium nulla obligatio est. A failed recovery is excused only if an 
execution of a recovery is impossible in objective and absolute terms. The 
subsequent sections identify the development of the jurisprudence of the 
exemption absolutely impossible.131 
4.2 Some unsuccessful cases  
The case law clarifies the distinct difference between impossible and 
absolutely impossible. Notably, the situation, which makes a recovery 
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absolutely impossible, must exist at the time of the Commission’s recovery 
decision, it cannot occur later. 132  
 
‘Absolutely impossible’ refers to whether it is, or is not, possible to recover. 
Significantly, it does not take into account which consequences a recovery 
will have to the undertaking. In Commission v Greece, the Court finds that 
the effect the recovery has on the financial status of the beneficiary is not 
relevant. A bankruptcy is an acceptable consequence of recovery. While the 
Union does not intend to encourage measures causing bankruptcy, in theory 
the recovery only restores the situation that would have occurred, had the aid 
not been initially granted. 133  
 
Nor is it of relevance whether a recovery will lead to a retrieval of any actual 
money. Most likely, a recovery in an insolvency case does not result in a 
return of the aid. An insolvent beneficiary is not reason enough to consider 
the recovery as an absolutely impossible mission. Preventing further 
distortion of the market is the key aim and thus the Member States are 
required to take action. In Commission v Belgium the Court concludes that a 
mere insolvency is not sufficient to remedy the situation. If an actual recovery 
is in fact impossible, the government has to insist on a full winding up of the 
undertaking. 134 
 
A recovery does not have to be financially wise to be considered possible; 
possible does not equal reasonable. The Commission does order a recovery, 
without any regard for the great financial costs and heavy workload such a 
decision will impose on the Member State. Challenges of technical or 
administrative nature may make a recovery difficult indeed; yet such a 
situation does not mean a recovery is absolutely impossible to complete.135  
 
In Italy v Commission the Member State argues that a recovery is impossible 
due to the fact it is technically impossible to identify the recipient. The 
identification process involves executing a specific review of a large quantity 
of declarations, made by almost 150 000 transport undertakings. According 
to the Court, the situation ”does present difficulties from an administrative 
point of view”136 but a recovery of the aid is technically not impossible. 
Hence, despite great costs, the state must execute the recovery decision.137  
 
In the decade to follow, the Court further clarified the interpretation of the 
recovery obligation, specifically in relation to it causing high administrative 
costs and heavy bureaucracy. The Court has consistently held that in a 
recovery producing, a heavy workload for the Member States is not a 
legitimate excuse to not execute the recovery. In Commission v Belgium the 
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Member State must calculate the exact number of workers actually employed 
during each quarter in order to identify the amount of aid to be recovered. 
Despite the heavy workload, the recovery is considered a task possible. 138 
 
Abstaining from a recovery is a derogation and shall thus receive a narrow 
interpretation. Hence, in order for a recovery to be absolutely impossible, a 
recovery must be de facto impossible. A generous interpretation would 
undermine the effectiveness of Union law in matters of state aid. A mere 
apprehension of such difficulty is not sufficient proof. The state must attempt 
to recover the aid, and the Member State’s efforts must be sincere and serious. 
If it is possible to indirectly calculate the amount to be recovered, a recovery 
does not qualify as impossible to execute.139  
 
The Member States are responsible for the execution of the recovery. In the 
event of unexpected difficulties, the general duty of sincere cooperation 
applies.140 The national authorities and the Commission are required to 
“work together in good faith with a view to overcoming difficulties whilst 
fully observing the Treaty provisions, and in particular the provisions on 
aid”.141 
 
Member States have argued that recovery would cause social unrest and 
disturbance of the society, therefore recovery would be impossible. In Italy v 
Commission the state acknowledges that the nation indeed has the technical 
ability to execute the recovery but argues that a recovery is nevertheless 
impossible; it would cause social upheaval. In the ruling, Italy receives no 
sympathy from the Court. Italy’s reason to not recover the aid is unacceptable. 
According to the Court, a Member State is under an obligation to try to 
recover. Since Italy has not made an attempt to recover the aid, the nation 
cannot prove that a recovery is absolutely impossible to execute.142  
4.3 A few successful cases  
Successful lines of argumentation, based on a recovery being absolutely 
impossible, are rare. Therefore, even cases in which the exemption of 
absolutely impossible is not explicitly acknowledged but in which it is in 
effect indirectly applied, are of interest. Due to a Member State’s insufficient 
records, the Commission has found that it is impossible to identify the amount 
to be recovered. In the decision, the Commission does not consider the 
recovery in itself to be impossible but since the identification process has 
failed, it is impossible to identify the correct amount of aid. To order a 
recovery in such a situation is a breach of the Member State's right of defence. 
That particular predicament constitutes an obstacle to a recovery.143   
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Insufficient records is a frequently occurring issue. An additional example of 
how the lack of proper records affects the recovery process follows. The 
Commission acknowledges that aid granted during a certain period is 
impossible to recover. The Member State does not have the tax records 
required to identify the beneficiary. Since the records simply do not exist, it 
is impossible to produce a recovery order formulated with a sufficient degree 
of clarity. Hence, a recovery is not possible.144   
 
In 2012, Italy managed to prove that a recovery was absolutely impossible.145 
It is one of few cases in which the exemption of absolutely impossible is 
acknowledged and applied explicitly. Italy exempted non-commercial entities 
devoted to certain activities, such as to social assistance, welfare, health, 
education, from a real estate tax. In the decision, the Commission finds that 
the Italian tax reduction does constitute state aid. Since the tax exemption is 
considered to be state aid, it is the subject of a recovery. The Italian tax 
records are, however, not adequately specific. It is not possible to separate 
commercial from the non-commercial entities. Thus, the Commission decides 
to completely refrain from ordering a recovery.  
 
Italy’s records are insufficient but the decision mentioned above is, 
nonetheless, arguably surprising. This is according to certain scholars. 
“Normally, the Commission should have instructed recovery on these 
grounds alone.”146 If the situation is assessed in accordance with the previous 
policy of the Commission, any aid, which cannot be proven to benefit non-
commercial entities exclusively, should be retrieved.  
4.4 Interim measures 
The following section assesses the case law of interim reliefs. Despite interim 
decisions not being final, they are included in this thesis since they do affect 
the potency of the regular recovery order. While a beneficiary can appeal a 
recovery decision, the appeal process does not automatically suspend the 
effect of the recovery decision. Only by ordering an interim relief may the 
Court suspend the recovery. Such a request is rarely granted. 147  
 
Firstly, an interim relief under Article 278 TFEU must not prejudge the 
substance of the case. The second criteria is fumus boni juris; the case must 
prima facie lack a clear answer. Thirdly, an interim measure must be urgent. 
Awaiting the final decision in the regular defence process has to be damaging; 
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an immediate execution of the recovery would cause grave and irreparable 
damages. The later criterion is often the most difficult to prove. 148  
 
One of the reasons as to why interim reliefs are rarely successful is simply 
that the structure of the recovery system does not encourage interim reliefs. 
A beneficiary with a strong main case of annulment in the regular process 
will most likely be denied an interim measure. Thus, the beneficiary has a 
better chance at receiving an interim relief by arguing that the main case is 
slightly weak. Considering the pending annulment proceedings, that might, 
however, not be tactically wise.149  
 
In Greece v Commission the General Court grants Greece an interim relief 
from its recovery obligation. The court states two reasons. First, the recovery 
is deferred due to the the extremely poor state of the “general financial 
situation” 150 in Greece. A recovery could lead to social unrest and diverge, 
possibly causing permanent damage. Thus, the situation calls for a temporary 
suspension of the recovery.  
 
The second reason is of technical and administrative nature. The court 
believes the current case will not result in a successful recovery. In addition, 
an immediate recovery would draw resources from the public authorities’ 
effort to recover tax debts. By offering the state an interim relief, the court 
provides the national authorities with an opportunity to concentrate on 
collecting tax income.151 The case indicates a future two-speed Europe in 
matters of state aid recovery.152  
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5 Defence 3: 10-year limit 
Aid which has escaped the attention of the Commission for ten years since it 
was awarded, cannot, in accordance with the Procedural Regulation, be 
recovered.153 Prior to the regulation, recovery of unlawful and incompatible 
aid had been at the Commission’s discretion, albeit ordering recovery had 
developed into a “nearly hard and fast practice”154.  
 
In the 1980s, aid to the industry and service-sector constituted 2% of EU’s 
GDP, in contrast to 0.5% in 2011.155 The recovery rate in the 1980s was 
unimpressive. As a result, at the time of the introduction of the regulation, a 
considerable amount of aid was not yet retrieved. The ten-year exemption 
provided legal certainty to the beneficiaries of the unrecovered aid.156  
 
Although the exemption is applied, beneficiaries should be careful not to 
exaggerate the practical value of the exemption.157 Of primary concern is how 
easily the ten-year period can be interrupted, without any need to inform the 
beneficiary. No formal investigation by the Commission is required, the ten-
year period is suspended if the Commission takes any action related to the 
unlawful aid. 158  
 
The ten-year period starts to run the day the aid is awarded. The starting date 
is easily identified for individual aid. If the aid is awarded under an aid 
scheme, the wording of the rule is not sufficiently clear. The moment when 
the aid scheme is put into effect does not necessarily coincide with the 
moment the aid is paid out. France Télécom provides “useful clarity”159 to 
the issue. The relevant point in time is the day the aid is actually paid out. 
Consequently, the limitation period start to run “afresh each time an 
advantage is actually granted”160. 
 
A beneficiary might find it useful to know that a suspension is not conditioned 
upon the notification of the beneficiary. As is clarified in Scott the Member 
State and the Commission are the parties of a state aid recovery.161 Despite 
the beneficiary having a “practical interest”162 to find out about the 
suspension, that interest is not sufficient to create a procedural right on behalf 
of the beneficiary.  
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6 Analogies 
6.1 Purpose and delimitation 
The Treaty is living law and its interpretation is ever evolving. State aid 
uniquely shares “more chromosomes with free movement than with antitrust 
rules” 163 while it simultaneously is a pillar of competition law. In order to 
assess how state aid develops, it is important to learn from areas of similar 
character: classic competition law, Internal market law and, due to its 
fundamental similarities with state aid, EU funds law. While being fully 
aware that this section cannot provide an exhaustive comparison, it may still 
offer useful analogies and indicate which changes are possible, while protect 
the fundamental function of state aid control system.  
6.2 Reform of classic competition law 
Regulation 1/2003 is the anno domino of modern classic competition law as 
with it, the system changed from ex-ante to ex-post control. 164 The old system 
was a two-step process consisting of prohibition and a possibility to grant 
exemptions. The latter was under the exclusive authority of the 
Commission.165  
 
Regulation 1/2003 indicated a departure from a form-based to an economic-
based approach and it introduced reforms in substantial and administrative 
matters.166 Previously, any agreement covered by Article 101 TFEU had to 
be authorised by the Commission. With an exponentially increasing case 
burden, the Commission became understaffed and the control system 
ineffective.167 The solution was a decentralization, giving responsibility to the 
national competition authorities.168  
6.3 Evolution of public procurement law 
Prior to 1992, limited preferential public procurement schemes were 
tolerated. However, impact assessments indicated that they only had a 
minimal impact and as a result of which, and as a result of the completion of 
the Single Market, they were abolished.169  
                                                 
163 De Cecco 2013, p. 38. 
164 Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the 
rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty. OJ L 1  p. 1, 4.1.2003. 
(Regulation 1/2003) 
165 De Cecco 2013, pp. 47-48. 
166 Szyszczak, 2011. p. 9. 
167 De Cecco 2013, p. 48. 
168  Szyszczak, 2011,  p. 9.  
169 Bovis, Christopher H. EU Public Procuremetn Law. Cheltenham 2012 2nd ed, pp. 34-35. 
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6.4 EU funds law 
EU funds, also referred to as structural funds, emanate from the EU budget 
and aim to strengthen structural and economic development, social cohesion 
and integration policy. It is administrated by the Commission, in cooperation 
with the Member States. Funds law and state aid law are, despite their 
similarities, two separate legal areas. 170  
 
In EU funds law, the Member State is the sole addressee of a Commission 
decision but despite the fact that the beneficiary is merely an interested party, 
the EUCJ safeguards the beneficiary’s right to a fair hearing. The EUCJ 
considers the funds decision to be a “measure adversely affecting that 
person”.171  
 
The Commission does have the authority to cancel or recover funds but has 
become decreasingly involved in the process. The Member States take a 
greater role. Neither the recovery of funds nor of state aid is a punishment, 
merely the logical consequence of discovering a wrongful action. 172 A more 
in-depth description of the rules and case law of funds recovery follows.  
 
In EU funds law, the Member States must retrieve any amount of funds 
misused whether it is a result of irregularity or of negligence of relevant 
instructions. In comparison with state aid law, the beneficiary may argue 
legitimate expectations, provided the beneficiary did not commit a manifest 
infringement of the rules or fail to fulfill its obligations.173  
 
Legitimate expectations require a precise, unconditional and consistent 
assurance from Union authorities. Further, the assurance must be delivered in 
a manner which can create legitimate expectations and the assurance must 
comply with applicable rules.174 
 
The legitimate expectations may derive from national or Union law. Within 
the area of funds law, the Court has been inclined to accept a greater scope of 
legitimate expectations created by national law, in contrast to the strict 
interpretation of the regulation of unduly paid state aid.175  
 
The interpretation of legitimate expectations in EU funds law generally 
appears to be the subject of a less strict interpretation than in state aid law.176 
A businessman receiving EU funds does not have to be quite as diligent. This 
is due to the fact that the prevalence of legitimate expectations does not 
                                                 
170 Nehl, Hanns Peter “Legal Protection in the Field of EU Funds.” 4 [2011] EStAL, pp. 
631-633 and 646. 
171 Nehl, 2011, p. 634.  
172 Nehl, 2011, pp. 631-633 and 646. 
173 Nehl, 2011, p. 647.  
174 Nehl, 2011, p. 647.  
175 Tridimas, 2006, p. 296. 
176 Nehl, 2011,  p. 647.  
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depend on whether the businessman “could have foreseen the adoption of a 
measure likely to affect its interests”177.  
 
In Oelmüle Hamburg et. al the principle of legitimate expectations takes 
priority over Union interests.178 Notably, this principle only precludes 
recovery of the funds if the beneficiary acts in good faith. Further, legitimate 
expectations only apply if the money has been transferred.179 EU funds law is 
subject of a more pragmatic interpretation; the more generous application of 
the principle “contrast sharply”180 with that of state aid law. It is “markedly 
different” 181 from that of state aid law, where the Court acts in a more 
interventionist manner. 
 
It could be argued that the difference in the interpretation of the two similar 
and yet different legal areas is due to the fact that in EU funds law, a Member 
State cannot gain a competitive advantage over another Member States. 
Arguably, the funds, in contrast to state aid, cannot affect competition 
between Member States. However, since it does affect competition between 
private undertakings, which in itself affects the market, it is difficult to find a 
valid reason as to why the principle of legitimate expectations should be given 
greater priority in funds law than in state aid law.182  
                                                 
177 Nehl, 2011, p. 647.  
178 Case C-298/96 Oelmühle Hamburg AG and Jb. Schmidt Söhne [1998] ECR I-4767, 
para. 37. 
179 Petzold, 2011, p. 91. 
180 Tridimas, 2006, p. 291. 
181 Tridimas, 2006, p. 290. 
182 Petzold, 2011, p. 91. 
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7 Transfer cases: the definition 
of the beneficiary  
7.1 Purpose and delimitation 
Three exemptions to recovery are recognised in the Recovery Notice: a 
recovery is in breach of Union principles, the ten-year limit and a recovery is 
absolutely impossible. These explicit exemptions do not alone determine 
whether an undertaking will be the subject of a recovery order.  
 
As a rule, aid is retrieved from the original recipient, whom is most likely to 
have benefited from the aid. Significantly, if it is possible to establish that 
other undertakings have benefited from the aid, they may be subject to a 
recovery order.183 In situations in which the original recipient’s shares, assets 
or a combination of the two have been transferred, identifying which 
undertakings are beneficiaries of the aid is a quite complicated task. The 
following chapter assesses three situations in which the identification process 
is a challenge: transfer of assets, transfer of shares and transfers in multi-layer 
aid. This chapter includes both facts and analysis, allowing for a presentation 
of the facts and of the academic arguments in their proper context.   
7.2 The aim of recovery 
While the general aim of state aid law is clear, the specific aim of the act of 
recovery remains “unclear”184. In a situation where multiple undertakings are 
beneficiary candidates, being aware of the precise aim of recovery is of 
tremendous benefit in in the process of identifying the proper beneficiary. The 
following section presents two of the aims of recovery, notably they are not 
necessarily contradictory. 
 
As this chapter will show, the case law and written law present two rationales 
of aims: to retrieve the monetary effect and to remedy the anti-competitive 
effect. The former is best explained by an analogy with condictio indebiti 
since the focus is to retrieve the “monetary benefit”185 from the state aid and, 
in contrast to antitrust law, the aim is not to punish.186 A recovery simply 
prevents the beneficiary from becoming unjustly enriched.  
 
                                                 
183 Case C-277/00 Germany v Commission [2004] E.C.R. I-3925, para. 80.  
184 Hancher, Ottervanger, Slot. 4th ed, 2012, p. 23. 
185 Monti, 2011, p. 421. 
186 Case C-75/97, Belgium v Commission (Maribel) [1999] ECR I-03671, para. 65.; Monti, 
2011, p. 416. 
 40 
Recovery emphasising the second aim, to target the anti-competitive effect, 
shall “re-establish”187 the competitive situation existing prior to the aid. It is 
often possible to combine the two rationales but they are not necessarily 
compatible.  
7.3 Transfer of assets 
7.3.1 Introduction  
It is primarily the Member States’ responsibility to identify the beneficiary. 
In order to protect equal treatment and prevent distortion of competition 
between Member States, the identification procedure is to be carried out in 
accordance with a common set of rules. The law is however “not yet fully 
established”188. The following sections presents situations in which the assets 
are transferred from the original recipient, including transfers caused by 
insolvency; the latter category is not covered in Chapter 8.2 Insolvency.  
7.3.2 Monetary effect  
The courts and the Commission consider both aims when making a decision: 
the retrieval of the monetary benefit and of the anti-competitive effect. In the 
Alfa Romeo case, the Commission chooses to focus on the monetary benefit. 
The background of the case is as follows: the assets of Alfa Romeo, the 
original recipient, was partly transferred to FIAT, the buyer, and partly to 
Fininmeccania, Alfa Romeo’s previous holding company. The new owners 
retained liabilities, in addition to new assets. 189 FIAT paid market price for 
the assets.  
 
In its decision, the Commission finds the fact that FIAT paid market price 
significant. As a result, the benefit remains with Fininmeccania. Since the 
state aid inflated the price to a market price, Fininmeccania gained the 
advantage. By that, Fininmeccania is the subject of the recovery order. The 
Court agrees with the reasoning of the Commission.  
 
In previous decisions the Commission has gone even further, deciding that 
the purchaser retained the benefit, even if it had paid the market price, a view 
largely dismissed by the Court.190 The Court endorses the Commission’s 
decision in Alfa Romeo; an interpretation which is confirmed in Banks and 
codified in the Recovery Notice.191 
 
If the seller of the assets receives market price, the seller remains liable. 
Conversely, if the transfer price is below that of the market, the liability 
                                                 
187 Joined cases C-328/99 and C-399/00 Italy and SIM 2 Multimedia SpA v Commission, 
[2003] ECR I-4035, para. 66. 
188 Monti, 2011, p .415. 
189 Case C-305/89 Italy v Commission (Alfa Romeo) [1991] ECR I-1603, para. 39. 
190 Gyarfas, Juraj ”Looking for the Beneficiary: State Aid Recovery after a Share Deal” 
ECLR Vol. 33 No. 1[2012], p. 40. 
191 Case C-390/98 Banks [2001] ECR I-6117, para. 78.; Recovery Notice, para. 33. 
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transfers with the assets. The monetary value does indeed remain with the 
seller. The “anticompetitive effects” is, however, not visible in the relevant 
market, the one in which the aid is introduced.192 Using the price to determine 
which undertaking shall be liable is using an approach that emphases the 
monetary effect and it does not restore the competitive situation. 193  
7.3.3 Anti-competitive effect 
The Court, in addition to the approach in Alfa Romeo, does pursue the anti-
competitive effect. The Commission and the Court use two parameters to 
identify the beneficiary: the price of the assets and the intention behind the 
transfer of the assets. If the assets are transferred for market price, the State’s 
intention appears to be irrelevant.194 The Commission and the Court examines 
the intention behind transfer of assets in two cases, Seleco-Multimedia/SIM2 
and SMI.195 
 
In the first case, the Commission creates criteria to assess if the transfer is of 
“economic logic”196 or if it is designed to escape recovery. Some of the 
criteria are the moment of transfer and the identity of the seller, as well as the 
acquirer. If a transfer is carried out in accordance with the procedural national 
law, for instance an insolvency law, the transaction is less likely to be seen as 
an effort to avoid recovery.197  
 
An example of the application of the subjective criterion is the Olympic 
Airways case, an action taken under 108(2) TFEU, for failure to comply with 
the preceding recovery decision. 198 In the opinion, AG Geelhoed emphasises 
the subjective criteria, stating that the system employed by Greece frustrates 
the intention of the recovery.  
 
This section provides a short summary of the history of the case. In 2002, the 
Commission ordered a recovery of the aid given to Olympic Airways. The 
subsequent year, in accordance with a new Greek law, the company 
undertook a restructuring. Several of the assets were transferred to the new 
company, Olympic Airlines, for no apparent reason. The liabilities remained 
with the old company. The new law granted the new company special 
protection from liabilities, such as a recovery order.  
 
In the opinion, AG Geelhoed argues that the anti-competitive effect is the 
essential aspect of the case. Olympic Airlines should bear the cost since it “is 
actually responsible/…/for the economic activities promoted by the aid in 
                                                 
192 Monti, 2011,  p. 421. 
193 Monti, 2011, p. 421. 
194 Monti, 2011, p. 423. 
195 Joined cases C-328/99 and C-399/00 Italy and SIM 2 Multimedia SpA v Commission, 
[2003] ECR I-4035.; Case C-277/00 Germany v Commission (SIM)[2004] E.C.R. I-3925. 
196 Joined cases C-328/99 and C-399/00 Italy and SIM 2 Multimedia SpA v Commission, 
[2003] ECR I-4035, para. 78. 
197 Case C-277/00 Germany v Commission (SIM)[2004] E.C.R. I-3925, para. 93 and 96. 
198 Case C-415/03 Commission v Greece [2005] ECR 3875, para. 34. 
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question”199 A recovery order should identify the undertaking which would 
have the “competitive advantage resulting from the/…/ aid”200 and in which 
there is “economic continuity”201 The acquirer is the subject of a recovery 
order, provided it is able to enjoy the benefit of the aid. Market price is an 
indication of whether the competitive effect is transferred. If the competitive 
effect of the aid is exceeding the monetary aid, the competitive benefit is 
transferred, despite that the assets are bought at a market price.202  
 
In its ruling, the Court did not focus on the price, despite it indicating whether 
the monetary benefit is transferred. The Court stresses the subjective criteria; 
that the restructuring is having a harmful effect on the recovery and thus the 
competition of the internal market. In order to avoid a situation in which the 
purpose of the recovery is “seriously compromised”203 the new company is 
the subject of the recovery order.  
7.4 Transfer of shares 
7.4.1 Introduction 
The second situation in which identifying the beneficiary is complicated is 
the transfer of the shares of the undertaking. The Commission may find that 
the previously owning holding company, the original recipient, or the acquirer 
of the shares is the beneficiary. The following sections clarify the assessment 
made by the Commission and the courts. 
7.4.2 Monetary effect 
In transfer of shares situations, the difference between the monetary and the 
competitive benefit does not present itself as clearly as it does when the assets 
are transferred. The primary addressee of a recovery decision is the original 
recipient, since “the sale of shares in a company which is the beneficiary of 
unlawful aid by a shareholder to a third party does not affect the requirement 
for recovery”.204 Corporate law suggests that the transfer of shares does not 
have an impact on the obligations of the recipient undertaking.205  
 
If no other aspects are taken into consideration, the recipient company is to 
be the subject of a recovery order, a rationale confirmed in ENI-Lanerossi206 
                                                 
199 Opinion of AG Geelhoed in Case C-415/03 Commission v Greece [2005] ECR 3875. 
para. 29.  
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and the Recovery Notice. 207 Such a recovery would retrieve the monetary 
benefit but not necessarily redeem the anti-competitive effect.  
7.4.3 The anti-competitive effect 
If the recipient retains its status as an independent legal person and continues 
the activities that made it qualify for aid, the purchaser is not responsible for 
the repayment of the aid. In SMI, the EUCJ stated that since the recipient 
retains its legal personality and the competitive advantage of the aid, the aid 
should normally be recovered from that undertaking.208 It is an approach that 
may contribute to remedy the competitive advantage while simultaneously 
reducing the seller’s opportunities to engage in speculation.209 
 
The assumption that the benefit remains with the recipient can be reversed; 
the transfer price is an important component. Notably, in CDA the General 
Court favours an approach in which the recipient remains responsible, 
regardless of the level of the transfer price. 210 
 
In SMI the Court finds that if the state aid element is reflected in the price, 
that is if it is at market price, the buyer cannot be held accountable in a 
recovery decision.211 The acquirer has not enjoyed the benefit of the aid. The 
“situation is to be restored primarily” 212 by making the seller responsible for 
the recovery. 
 
The line of reasoning is confirmed in Spanish Shipyards213, a Commission 
decision in which the shares have been transferred in a closed and selective 
procedure. The buyer bought the shares from a company belonging to the 
same group as the buyer. The Commission finds that under such 
circumstances the benefit does not stay with the original recipient but 
transfers with the shares. The successor of the previously independent 
company gains the benefit, thus the buyer should be responsible for the aid 
repayment. 214  
7.5 Multi-layer aid 
In a multi-layer transfer of aid, neither the shares nor the assets are relocated, 
nevertheless, the benefit is transmitted from the original recipient. If the setup 
                                                 
207 Recovery Notice para, 34. 
208 Case C-277/00 Germany v Commission [2004] E.C.R. I-3925, para. 81. 
209 Opinion of AG Tizzano of Case C-277/00 Germany v Commission [2004] E.C.R. I-
3925, para. 84.  
210 Case T-324/00 CDA Datenträger Albrechts v Commission [2005] ECR II-4309. 
211 Case C-277/00 Germany v Commission [2004] E.C.R. I-3925, para. 80. 
212 Case C-390/98 Banks [2001] ECR I-6117, para. 78. 
213 C(2004)1620 Commission decision of 12 May 2004 on the State aid implemented by 
Spain for further restructuring aid to the public Spanish shipyards State aid case C40/00 (ex 
NN 61/00) OJ L58 p 29 4.3.2005, para. 120.  
214 Hancher, Ottervanger, Slot. 4th ed, 2012, p. 1015. 
 44 
is made with the intention to circumvent the state aid control, the recovery 
obligation may not move with the transferred benefit.  
 
The repayment obligation cannot continue to be transferred perpetually. 
Searching for the beneficiary among consumers or in “upstream markets”215 
is not realistic, or to the benefit of the principle of legal certainty. The 
following section assesses how far down in the transfer chain the aid can be 
recovered.  
                      Figure 2. 
   
 
The parties of the case Residex are the Municipality of Rotterdam and 
Residex. 216 The Port authority Gemeentelijk Havenbedrijf Rotterdam (GHR) 
is not a separate legal entity from the Municipality. Thus, the port authority 
and the municipality are treated as one. 
 
In Residex the public port authority GHR provides the financial institution 
Residex with a guarantee to cover a loan by a third party; enabling Residex 
to issue a loan to Aerospace with beneficial conditions, illustrated in Figure 
2. GHR subsequently refuses to honour the guarantee, arguing it has the right 
to do so since the aid is not notified in accordance with Article 108(3) TFEU. 
The legal question is: which undertaking is the beneficiary?  
 
The guarantee granted, at the first level transfer, is considered as state aid. 
The Court identifies, however, the borrower, Aerospace, as the primary 
beneficiary. The Court focuses on the advantage, reasoning it is the borrower 
that “normally obtains a financial advantage and thus benefits from the 
aid”217.  
 
According to the Court, both the lender and the borrower in the situation can 
be “beneficiaries of that guarantee”218. The creditor, Residex, can be 
considered a beneficiary if the guarantee is granted to cover the needs of an 
existing claim, from the lender on the borrower, when the borrower is 
reconstructed. Thus, the guarantee is increasing the security of a claim which 
is financially beneficial. The final identification of the beneficiary, however, 
is the responsibility of the national court. 219 
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In order to remedy the disturbance on the internal market, the Court expects 
a recovery from the second level transfer, as a minimum measure. A 
cancelation of the first level obligation contract is not necessarily required. 
The national court is allowed to cancel the guarantee, if such a measure 
restores the competitive situation existing prior to the aid. Only if the national 
system does not provide alternative means to restore the competition, the 
national court is obliged to cancel the first level guarantee. 220 
                                                 
220 Köhler, 2013, pp. 101-103. 
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8 The definition of recovery -  
insolvency and Article 260(2)  
8.1 Purpose and delimitation 
Effective recovery is essential to the efficiency of the state aid control system. 
Given the multitude of situations, methods of calculation and types of state 
aids in the state aid system, the definition of ‘effective’ is not quite as easily 
identified as could be expected. This chapter investigates how the Union 
defines effective. It is achieved by studying the jurisprudence of insolvency 
cases and actions under Article 260(2) TFEU for examples of sufficient and 
insufficient effectiveness.  
8.2 Insolvency 
In insolvency cases, the state aid regulation is frequently in conflict with 
national insolvency laws. The aim of the national insolvency laws is often to 
allow the business to continue its operation, thereby improving the creditors’ 
chances of collecting their debt.221 The beneficiary may find the conflicting 
national and Union laws confusing but the courts do not. National procedures 
and laws preventing an effective recovery of the aid are to be left unapplied.222  
 
Aid that proves difficult to retrieve, must be registered by the state as a claim 
in the insolvency proceeding. A mere registration of the debt is not enough, 
since it could potentially allow the indebted beneficiary to continue to distort 
the market. It is the duty of the state, second to a full recovery, to ensure that 
the undertaking is not only insolvent but that it is completely winded up.223 
 
As a creditor in an insolvency proceeding, the state is under no obligation to 
file for preferential treatment. True, the aid must be registered as a “liability 
relating to the repayment of the aid in question in the schedule of liabilities” 
224 but no further effort is required. A registration in combination with the 
beneficiary being winded up is enough to prevent further distortion of the 
internal market.  
 
While the Commission’s obligation to order a recovery of the aid is not 
conditioned on any money being retrieved, the Commission does not have an 
obligation unless the recovery will have an effect on the internal market. If at 
the time of the Commission’s decision, the beneficiary has ceased its 
economic activity, and the insolvency proceedings is terminated, the 
                                                 
221 Hancher, Ottervanger, Slot. 4th ed, 2012, p. 1013. 
222 Case C-323/05 Commission v France [2006] ECR I-10071, para. 53. 
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224 Case C-277/00 Germny v Comission [2004] E.C.R. I-3925, para. 85.  
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Commission can forgo a recovery decision.225 In contrast, in a situation in 
which the insolvency proceeding is still ongoing, at the time of the 
Commission decision, or the insolvency proceeding is not initiated until after 
the Commission’s decision, the Commission is under an obligation to order a 
recovery. 
8.3 Infringement: Article 260(2) TFEU 
Further food for thought is found in Article 260(2) TFEU case law. Arguably, 
Commission v Greece226 provides the most explicit account of an 
effectiveness assessment. The case is the very first state aid case submitted 
by the Court under Article 260(2). Subsequently other cases followed. 227 
They provide valuable insight as to which measures effectively reverse the 
effects of the aid and which situations are considered harmful to the Internal 
market.  
 
Commission v Greece establishes that a successful recovery does not require 
a transfer of money. The Member States are allowed to choose the method of 
reversal, provided the recovery is effective, immediate and transparent to the 
Commission. The Court found that a set-off operation is a valid form of 
recovery.228 
 
Previously the Court has avoided situations in which a new aid could in effect 
compensate for an existing recovery obligation. The Deggendorf-principle 
stipulates that the granting of new aid may be conditioned upon the successful 
recovery of previously granted and not yet recovered incompatible aid.229  
 
The Court holds the infringement, conducted by Greece, as serious, bearing 
in mind “the rules on State aid are vital to the establishment of a system which 
is designed to ensure that there is no distortion of competition in the Internal 
market”230. In addition, time is an important parameter used to determine the 
severity of the infringement.231 
 
Further, the graveness of the infringement is determined by the “the legal and 
factual context of the infringement”232 and the need for deterring measures. 
The Member State has infringed the Article 108(2) TFEU on several 
occasions, making the new infringement more severe.  
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9 Summary: de lege lata  
A majority of the state aid measures are properly notified. Thanks to relatively 
recent reforms, yet fewer measures will have to be notified. Aid in breach of 
Article 107 TFEU is retrieved in full; aid in breach of Article 108(3) is the 
subject of interest payments. A recovery is compulsory save the three 
recognised exemptions: a recovery is in breach of Union legal principles, the 
ten-year limit has expired or a recovery is absolutely impossible.  
 
In accordance with Union principles, exemptions are interpreted restrictively. 
The Commission rarely considers a recovery to be in breach of a Union 
principle. A flat recovery is always acceptable. The national procedural 
autonomy is deprioritised in favour of Union interest. A recovery order cannot 
be postponed in eternity, or be too unclear, but the Commission enjoys a wide 
margin of interpretation. 
 
Legitimate expectations can only derive from legitimate community sources 
and normally a notification is required, the RSV-case being a notable 
exception. The expectation must be reasonable and any foreseeable changes 
cannot give rise to legitimate expectations. A beneficiary may hold legitimate 
expectations of certain transitional measures and of that certain state measures 
will cease to be state aid.  
 
A recovery may be considered impossible if the records required to identify 
the beneficiary, or the amount, are deemed insufficient. Problems of an 
administrative or technical nature are not legitimate excuses. The Member 
State must make a serious and real attempt to recover the aid. Fear of social 
upheaval and reduced tax income may grant interim relief. Lastly, the ten year 
limit can easily be aborted, without the knowledge of the beneficiary.  
 
Internal market law has a history of protectionism. Classic competition law 
has undergone a greater decentralisation than that of state aid law, despite the 
state aid reforms under SAAP and SAM. The Court interprets the principle of 
legitimate expectations slightly less strict in funds law than in state aid law.  
 
There are relevant state aid cases that are not subject to any of the three 
exemptions. A transfer of assets, shares or of the benefit may result in a 
situation in which the original recipient is no longer the beneficiary. A 
recovery may remedy the competitive effect or the monetary benefit. 
 
To complete the summary, any recovery claim on an insolvent beneficiary 
must be properly registered. Unless the aid is recovered, the undertaking must 
be winded-up. The number of cases under Article 260(2) TFEU is increasing. 
A Member State may, within reason, choose the preferred method of 
recovery; a set-off is an acceptable measure.  
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10 Analysis 
10.1 General problems of recovery 
A prima facie reading of primary law indicates no duty to protect the interest 
of the businessman. The following analysis is founded upon the assumption 
that Union law intends to, and should, offer the businessman some protection; 
the scope of which is discussed in this analysis. Consequently, the analysis is 
written from the perspective of the businessman and the word problem is used 
to indicate the struggles of the beneficiary.   
 
The Internal market and competition is at the heart of the European Union 
and no one is advocating that the Union should adopt a laissez faire attitude 
in all matters of state aid. Recovery must remain the primary remedy in state 
aid law since without which, the system would most likely be rendered 
completely inefficient. Rather, the intention is to investigate whether the 
recovery measure could be reformed to the simultaneous benefit of the 
beneficiaries and of the Internal market.  
 
While recovery is standard procedure, some exemptions apply. The 
exemptions are: a recovery is in breach of Union principles, a recovery is 
absolutely impossible or the aid was granted over ten years ago. These 
exemptions are more than merely theoretical. For each of the recognised 
exemptions, the courts and the Commission have recognised at least one 
successful defence case.  
 
State aid control has been, is and will be reformed. An effect of the relatively 
recent reforms is the decentralization of the control system. The Union is 
encouraging the national authorities to take greater responsibility for the 
supervision through the Recovery Notice and the Enforcement Notice. The 
Commission exercises less direct control, following the expanded scope of 
the de minimis Notice and of the GBER. The Commission’s direct 
involvement is further limited by the fast track procedure and, if the proposal 
is put into effect, a mandate to prioritise among the incoming complaints.  
 
A majority of the aid recipients will not go through a defence of recovery 
process. The system is structured to reduce the need for recoveries. The 
combined effect of the standstill obligation, the incompatibility assessment, 
the GBER and the de minimis notice is a system where recovery generally is 
not needed. The defence process is a last resort, a final attempt to win where 
all else has failed.  
 
Given that defence procedures are a last resort, the pool of cases to analyse is 
limited; successful cases even fewer. Not recovering is an exemption and 
since exemptions are interpreted strictly, no other outcome should be 
expected.  
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The analysis is focusing on cases which provide legitimate arguments in 
favour of a changed interpretation, albeit they are not necessarily successful 
cases. The majority of the cases presented in the de lege lata-section are not 
commented upon in great detail but the cases are not redundant. The purpose 
is to indirectly highlight the line of reasoning. 
 
While most defences of recovery cases are not successful, they remain legally 
and politically relevant since they contribute to identifying the perceived 
problems of the current system. There is a discrepancy in the undertakings’, 
the Member States’ and the Union’s understanding and interpretation of the 
system. The most efficient remedy is prevention. In a less-then-clear system, 
prevention proves a challenge. 
 
To provide the parameters of the analysis the specific aim of recovery must 
be identified; the aim does define the need for change. Further, the level of 
the state aid system’s stability and the internal market’s level of stability must 
be assessed, since they determine the scope of future reforms. 
 
10.2 Context: general scope of change 
10.2.1 The aim of recovery 
Admittedly, a significant portion of the following analysis has been touched 
upon in Chapter 7 Transfer cases. Clarity takes priority over originality and 
therefore several of the arguments are once again discussed in this chapter. 
The general aim of the greater state aid control system is to ensure the 
functioning of the Internal market, and to protect the competition between 
undertakings and between Member States. Member States have been prone to 
engage in protectionist behavior not only in the state aid area but also in 
matters controlled by Internal market law, emphasising the need for 
supranational control.  
 
The general aim of state aid control is clearly defined, the same cannot 
however be stated for the specific measure to recover incompatible and 
unlawful state aid. The functioning of the Internal market is protected by a 
plethora of measures, each with its own sub-aim. An analysis of the case law 
and academic debate leads to the identification of three sub-aims: removing 
the anti-competitive effect, canceling the monetary effect and creating 
deterrence. Arguably, this analysis will show that it is clear from facts 
presented in the de lege lata-part that the system should be designed to 
prioritise the removal of the anti-competitive effect.  
 
The case law of various types of procedures contribute to the analysis but in 
very different ways. The transfer cases, and to a limited extent cases of 
insolvency and those Article 260(2) TFEU, contribute to identify two of the 
aims, which are to remedy the anti-competitive effect and the retrieval of 
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monetary benefit. An analysis of these two aims contribute to identify the 
third aim, which is to deter.  
 
To elaborate, the aims are detected through analysing the case law and 
academic debate of transfer cases, insolvency cases and Article 260(2) TFEU 
cases. Analysing those cases is more rewarding and illuminating than to 
analyses cases of the three acknowledge exemptions, since the Commission 
and the courts are under an obligation to interpret the exemptions restrictively. 
In some types of cases belonging to the former category, the beneficiary is 
not easily identified. The courts and the Commission’s chosen means to 
identify the beneficiary shed light on which aim is prioritised; a different 
priority might have resulted in a different beneficiary. 
 
Any recovery measure must effectively achieve the aim or aims of recovery. 
The measures which the courts acknowledge as effective means provide 
guidance as to the nature of the aim or aims of recovery. The Commission 
and the courts, restricted only by the duty to protect the Internal market and 
issues of a practical nature, enjoy a greater degree of freedom in transfer cases 
than in the classic recovery exemption-cases. Hence, an analysis of the 
transfer cases shows the true intention, purpose and priorities of the 
Commission and the courts.  
 
Firstly, the transfer case law contributes to identify the aims to reverse the 
anti-competitive effect and the purpose to retrieve the monetary benefit. The 
writing of the rulings stress the importance to reverse the anti-competitive 
effect; in reality, that is not necessarily achieved. In Alfa Romeo, the Union 
focuses on reversing the monetary effect, not the anti-competitive effect. The 
price point is allowed to determine the assessment of to where the benefit has 
transferred. 
 
The price point alone cannot tell where the anti-competitive effect is or 
whether it has been transferred to other markets. Since the monetary benefit 
is visible in the market where the aid was introduced, the undertaking that 
retains the monetary benefit is the subject of the recovery decision. Since the 
aim is not to punish, the only reasonable conclusion is that a reversal of the 
pure monetary effect is satisfactory to the Union.  
 
In many situations, the monetary and the anti-competitive affects are the 
same. However, that is not always the case. The case law indicates that in 
transfer of shares cases, the difference between the two aims is not quite as 
large as in transfer of assets cases. Arguably, the protection of the competitive 
effect takes priority, although the effort to protect has limits; beyond those 
limits, a retrieval of the monetary effect is perfectly acceptable.  
 
The multi-layer case law provides further evidence of the anti-competitive 
effect being prioritised. The Court states that the Member States are only 
obliged to act to prevent or reverse any anti-competitive effects. Residex is an 
example since Residex, despite receiving a guarantee and despite the fact that 
a guarantee can result in an improvement of an undertaking’s financial 
 52 
situation, is not, by the Court, automatically identified as the aid beneficiary. 
Only if the claim, which the guarantee covers, existed prior to the guarantee 
should Residex be considered the beneficiary; else the guarantee does not 
improve the undertaking’s competitive situation.  
 
It is shown in the case law that in regards to transfer of assets-cases, the price 
points take center stage, which could be problematic since it could result in a 
reversal of only the monetary effect. It is important to remember to design a 
system that prevents anti-competitive effects in addition to achieving 
deterrence. The case Olympic Airlines serves as an example that such a system 
may in fact be realistic. The Court attempts to indirectly identify the anti-
competitive effect, by analysing whether the aid is sound business; a test 
which shares similarities with the private investor test. Through assessing the 
Greek measure’s harmful effect on the control system, the Court can indirectly 
identify the harmful effect on the competitive situation.  
 
At variance with the court, AG Geelhoed focuses directly on the anti-
competitive effect, applying the concept of economic continuation in order to 
identify how and to where the anti-competitive benefit has been transferred. 
In summary, with the newly created company receiving all of the advantages 
but none of the disadvantages, the competitive benefit is in fact transferred to 
the newly minted company. Interestingly, AG Geelhoed and the Court reach 
similar conclusions, but on different grounds. The Court does not explicitly 
endorse the argumentation presented by AG Geelhoed. 
 
The final argument, in support of the notion that remedying the anti-
competitive effect is the main aim of state aid recovery, is the combined result 
of analysing transfer cases, insolvency cases and Article 260(2) TFEU 
procedures. A Member State’s budget does in fact benefit from a recovery, 
since the state, not the Union, receives the retrieved aid. It is shown in 
multiple cases that the aim of recovery is never to provide income to the state 
but to prevent further distortion of the Internal market. Consequently, 
preferential treatment of the state, the creditor, is not required; it is not 
acceptable to reconstruct the company and later retrieve the aid; and a 
complete winding up of the beneficiary is required. The logical conclusion is 
thus that the aim of recovery is to prevent further anti-competitive effect on 
the market; not to remedy the purely monetary benefit.  
 
Secondly, state aid recovery has three aims two of which, i.e. to remedy the 
anti-competitive effect and to remedy the monetary benefit, are described in 
previous sections of this chapter. The Olympic Airlines-case illustrates the 
third aim, which is to deter. The Court introduces a subjective criterion. 
Member States taking measures to circumvent the state aid control are more 
likely to face a recovery decision. Hence, the Court contemplates the 
decision’s effect on the Member State’s behaviour and not only its effect on 
the Internal market.  
 
Deterrence can be interpreted differently: a synonym of punishment or a 
synonym of prevention. Certain scholars argue that recovery shall neither 
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punish nor deter, since recovery is not fault-based. For the purpose of this 
thesis, deterrence is interpreted as prevention or discouragement, as opposed 
to a reprimand or punishment. The purpose of the recovery is to challenge 
and encourage legal persons to take responsibility. While it is true that the 
courts repeatedly have clarified that recovery is not a punishment, arguably, 
it does serve the purpose of deterrence.  
 
An infringement is considered particularly alarming if committed by a serial 
infringing Member State, as is evident from Article 260(2) TFEU case law. 
Thus, the Court does not only considers the state’s action in that particular 
situation but its general pattern in state aid recovery. Since a multi infringing 
state is more likely to become the subject of an Article 260(2), it is evident 
that the Court emphasises the preventative effect of the procedure, and not 
whether it will remove an anti-competitive effect in the individual case.  
 
A set-off as a means of recovery and the Deggendorf principle are both 
situations in which the Member State cancels the recovery claim. Only the 
former method is accepted by the Union. In the latter, the Member State grants 
the beneficiary the aid by a post recovery decision, which if allowed, could 
potentially lead to a subsidy war. It would be considered as a waste of tax-
payers’ money. Considering an aim of SAM is to bring the Member States’ 
budgets under control, to not allow measures which would possibly hinder 
achieving that aim is arguably prevention. 
 
It is evident from the nature of state aid reform that one aim of state aid 
recovery is deterrence. Both SAAP and SAM aim to affect the behavior of 
the Member State and the beneficiaries; they offer an indirect method of 
prevention. Proper notification is not only a matter of purely procedural law. 
It is crucial to the Union’s ability to contentiously conduct compatibility 
assessments. Since the reforms facilitate proper notification, the reforms thus 
aim to encourage the Member States’ benevolent participation in the state aid 
control, thus protecting the control system.  
 
Recovery has three identified aims. The case law of transfer of assets and of 
shares does not with certainty prove which aim takes priority. Arguably, 
however, the question of greatest significance is not which aim takes priority 
but which aim contributes, to the greatest extent, to the protection of the 
Internal market. The answer is found by analysing the legal context in which 
state aid law operates. Since state aid control is a part of competition law, it 
is reasonable to assume that recovery should primarily concern itself with 
remedying the anti-competitive effect. Retrieving only the monetary effect 
may not improve the competitive situation, hence, such actions might 
indirectly contribute to the distortion of the Internal market.  
10.2.2 The state of the state aid system 
Any reform of the state aid recovery mechanism must protect the interest of 
the beneficiary as well as the functioning of the Internal market to satisfaction. 
Logically, increased protection of the beneficiary must only be allowed if the 
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state aid control system is efficient and stable. The history of state aid law 
indicates that without a functioning control system, the Member States do not 
show the required state aid discipline. The earlier years were characterised by 
subsidy wars, poor notification rate and wide-spread miscommunication with 
the Commission.  
 
The theory is simple: a strong Internal market can afford a relaxation of the 
state aid control, without any risk of harming the protection of the functioning 
of the Internal market. For the purpose of this thesis, the strength and the 
resilience of the entire Internal market does not need to be assessed, an 
assessment of the strength of the state aid control system is sufficient. The 
modernisation of the state aid control system has increased the efficiency and 
stability of the system. The statistics indicate that the recovery rates have 
improved; hence the system has become stronger. Arguably, the system is 
stable. It can hence afford a relaxation of the application of the recovery 
obligation.  
 
The reforms under SAAP and SAM lead to a de facto decentralization. With 
the increased de minimis threshold and an enlarged GBER, the Commission 
has in effect limited its own authority in performing detailed supervision. 
Thus, the Commission considers the system sufficiently viable and healthy to 
allow a relaxation of the supranational control. The stability of the system is 
illustrated by the fact that despite that 40% of the GBER cases being 
potentially problematic, the Commission will not abolish the less strict 
control. 
 
Notably, classic competition law has undergone an even greater 
decentralization and yet the state of the Internal market does not demand for 
the decentralisation to be reversed. Classic competition law belongs to the 
same legal family as state aid law and since both legal areas shall protect the 
same Internal market, the system is arguably able to accept the same level of 
relaxation of control in both areas.  
 
To present a counterargument, the effects of relaxed control in classic 
competition law is not comparable to the effects of relaxed state aid control. 
This is due to the fact that the classic competition law is concerned with 
actions between private parties. A relaxation of the state aid law interpretation 
will result in Member States supervising themselves which, historically, is 
not a successful approach.  
 
The state aid system has, however, proven itself capable of surviving a 
temporary but intense relaxation, a result of the financial crisis. Despite the 
lower quality of ex-ante control, which is an inevitable consequence of the 24 
hour time frame under Article 107(3)b TFEU, the aid control system remains 
intact. 
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10.3 Specific issues 
10.3.1 The role of legitimate expectations 
The principle of legitimate expectation deserves attention. A discussion about 
legitimate expectations is a discussion about jurisdiction. As a rule, 
expectations are considered legitimate exclusively when founded upon formal 
jurisdiction; which in this thesis is referred to as absolute jurisdiction. 
Consequently, a Commission decision but not a Commission suggestion, can 
cause legitimate expectations. The courts expect the businessman to be aware 
of every aspect of the state aid system while the Union institutions have no 
obligation to clarify its jurisdiction.  
 
In contrast, the beneficiary often rely on perceived jurisdiction in its 
argumentation. The beneficiary may believe a measure is not state aid and 
thus does not understand that the Commission has jurisdiction to assess the 
measure’s compatibility. It is an argument with limited effect on the courts. 
Normally, the beneficiary has to face the consequences of misunderstanding 
the jurisdiction or the system.  
 
The Union is not entirely uncompromising. A few success cases prove there 
is a narrow corridor in which the Union accepts legitimate expectations 
caused by perceived jurisdiction. If the beneficiary believes the issuing body 
has absolute jurisdiction or if the beneficiary is unaware that the jurisdiction 
has been used to change the situation, and it has limited opportunity to learn 
about the facts, the beneficiary may hold legitimate expectations. Thus the 
Union has accepted that relative jurisdiction is a valid argument. The scope 
of its acceptance is, however, open to discussion.  
 
Overlapping jurisdiction is a key concern in the sibling legal area of national 
procedural autonomy. Whereas in cases concerning legitimate expectations 
the issue is the balancing of absolute and perceived jurisdiction which both 
are within Union jurisdiction, in national procedural autonomy cases, the 
courts must balance the jurisdiction of the Member State and the jurisdiction 
of the Union.  
 
Cases of national procedural autonomy are divided into two categories: 
national cases based on legitimate expectation and cases of res judicata. The 
two categories fall within two different jurisdictions, res judicata cases 
having an especially uphill battle. Most likely there is no scope, within state 
aid, to increase the importance of res judicata. Such an interpretation would 
indirectly result in a decentralisation of the legislative jurisdiction. Certainly, 
the State aid control system has undergone a decentralisation but of the 
executive and, to some extent, judicial power. A decentralisation of the 
legislative power would be detrimental to the Internal market, as it would 
challenge the current supranational gravity of the system.  
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In contrast, legitimate expectations deriving from national law do not cause 
the same concerns. The Union has no specific procedural law hence the 
national procedural laws cannot intrude on the Union’s legislative 
jurisdiction. The Member States are enjoying, rightly so, a certain liberty 
when executing the recovery decisions. In conclusion, cases of this nature 
should be treated in the same way as the other legitimate expectation cases. 
 
As previously stated, the Union has accepted that, to a certain degree, 
perceived jurisdiction may render legitimate expectations. This is significant. 
The current systems do invite confusion. With the current system largely 
being regulated by soft law, the difficulty of identifying the scope of 
jurisdiction and the Commission’s, possibly, ill-advised attempt at clarifying 
the definition of state aid, a businessman may easily hold expectations of 
relative jurisdiction.  
 
Arguably, the Internal market does not benefit from confused and surprised 
beneficiaries having to return aid. Such a system does not contribute to 
achieving deterrence. Harsh remedies are efficient only if the undertakings 
understand why their actions are illicit. In an unclear system, the beneficiaries 
are simply too confused to be able to act in a proper manner. This paragraph 
speaks only of the aim to deter, achieving one aim might decrease the 
probability to achieve the other aims.  
 
Some aids must be retrieved to prevent anti-competitive effects, else the 
system will be left completely inefficient, but preventing anti-competitive 
effects is not the only aim. Notably, the Court acknowledges that in situations 
in which the beneficiary is confused as to the definition of state aid and said 
confusion is due to the changing status of the measure as aid or not aid, the 
interest of the beneficiary should be taken into great consideration. This is 
evident in the cases of reasonable expectations of transitional measures. I 
agree with AG Jacobs; if a measure is not obvious state aid, it is not justifiable 
to recover. Considering that the definition of state aid is evolving, any other 
interpretation would ask the businessman to be more diligent than the courts. 
 
An analogy with EU funds law indicates that a relaxed interpretation of the 
exemption legitimate expectations does not automatically lead to failure in 
regards to achieving the aims of recovery. In contrast to state aid law, in EU 
funds law the exception of legitimate expectation is interpreted with more 
generosity. EU funds law shares great similarities with state aid law. The 
exemption should receive equal interpretation in both of the legal areas.  
 
To present a counterargument: the analogy lacks relevance. Since the funds 
law decisions are made by the Union and not the Member State, the 
supranational structure of the system remains intact. Consequently, EU funds 
do not affect competition between Member States.  
 
The weakness of the counterargument is that EU funds do affect competition 
between Member States, albeit the Union, unlike Member States, does not 
have any incentive to act with bias. Further, the EU funds may have a negative 
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effect on competition between undertakings, which harms the Internal 
market. Since state aid and EU funds have similar effects on the Internal 
market, drawing inspiration from EU funds law, the market can afford a 
relaxation of the interpretation of the principle of legitimate expectations in 
the area of state aid.  
 
To conclude, despite a strict interpretation of the principle of legitimate 
expectations, due to a certain level of confusion regarding the rules and case 
law, recovery does not deter. The system has accepted that the interest of the 
beneficiary receives some priority in situations in which it is difficult to assess 
whether a measure constitutes state aid. Lastly, the principle of legitimate 
expectations should be interpreted slightly more relaxed, equal to the 
interpretation of the exemption in EU funds law.  
10.3.2 Time as an argument 
Justice delayed could be justice denied, hence time has always been of the 
essence in the Union system. This section is an analysis of the significance of 
time as an argument in cases based on legitimate expectations and good 
administration. Legitimate expectations arguments can be divided into two 
categories: arguments related to jurisdiction, analysed in the above section, 
and arguments associated with the Union institutions’ duty to exercise power. 
Lengthy procedures are in effect a delayed exercise of power.  
 
As is evident in the case law, whether the time elapsed is considered 
acceptable depends on the assessment of two parameters: the behavior or 
actions of the Member State involved and, as seen in the RSV case, the length 
of the time period. It is important to keep in mind that despite lengthy 
procedures not being abnormal, successful defences of recovery are rare.  
 
The meaning of the first parameter could be summed up as follows: as RSV 
and CELF v SIDE II shows; whereas good faith grants no advantages, bad 
faith may cause disadvantages. Case CELF v SIDE II and CETM clarifies that 
if the delay is caused by the Member State’s actions or by the structure of the 
system, the beneficiary may not hold a legitimate expectation. Interestingly, 
the courts appear to emphasise the importance of deterrence. They ask a 
question of almost ideological character: does the beneficiary deserve a 
successful defence of recovery?  
 
Recovery has three aims. While the above reasoning protects the aim of 
deterrence, it does not cater to the aim of reversing the anti-competitive effect. 
The question the Union should ask is: does the recovery contribute to remedy 
the anti-competitive effect? When a considerable amount of time has passed 
since the aid was paid out, the answer may very well be negative; a 
considerable amount of the anti-competitive effect has transferred upstream 
to consumers or to other markets. Retrieving the monetary effect is still a 
realistic option but reversing the anti-competitive effect is a challenge, and an 
ever increasing one as time elapses. A retrieval of the anti-competitive effect 
requires early action. 
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Time is of the essence, as resources. The principle of the above argument is 
not an original idea, the Union adhere to a ten-year limit on recovery 
decisions. The limit was introduced to protect the beneficiary’s legal 
certainty. It is highly unlikely that a beneficiary escapes a recovery decision 
due to it being a breach of the principle of legal certainty. Arguably, the Union 
assess that with the passing of the ten years, the effect a recovery has on the 
Internal market is diminished to the point where that otherwise deprioritised 
protection of legal certainty takes priority. 
 
According to the Court, recovery is not a punishment, merely the logical 
consequence of incompatibility. The logic is arguably slightly flawed. 
Considering the beneficiary cannot notify state aid and lacks the right to be 
informed when the ten-year period is aborted, the beneficiary’s position is 
weak. Thus, actions that are out of the beneficiary’s control can cause the 
beneficiary harm. A recovery should serve a purpose beyond providing 
income to the state. Recovery which fails to remedy the anti-competitive 
effect are surprisingly similar to a recovery whose sole purpose is to provide 
income to the state.  
 
In summary, the courts and the Commission should not ask whether a 
beneficiary deserves to be exempted from recovery but whether a recovery 
will remedy the anti-competitive effect.  
10.3.3 Legal certainty -  absolutely impossible 
The case law identifies two criteria of legal certainty: clarity of the recovery 
decision itself and the Commission’s obligation to exercise its power within 
a reasonable time frame. The former criterion is related to legitimate 
expectations, hardly surprising, considering the Court often apply the two as 
one. The latter is analysed in the previous section.  
 
The first criterion, clarity of the recovery orders, is intriguing, its application 
mirrors that of the exemption of absolutely impossible. Whereas the latter 
exemption refers to the Commissions ability to collect sufficient information 
to form a well-founded decision, the former is concerned with the Member 
States’ ability to understand the Commission’s decision.  
 
The exemption of ‘absolutely impossible’ is not a principle, thus it does not 
have to be balanced against other principles, rather it is a digital question. A 
recovery either is or is not possible. Hence, the duty to cooperate is heavily 
emphasised since the Union institutions must be absolutely certain that there 
is no possibility to retrieve.  
 
Repeatedly, the Court has clarified that a proportionality assessment is not a 
part of the assessment of whether a recovery is possible. The effect a recovery 
has on the beneficiary is irrelevant, as is the administrative and monetary cost 
of carrying out the recovery. Further, it is irrelevant whether a recovery results 
in the recovery of actual money. To conclude, the key to a successful defence 
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is insufficient records; it must be literally impossible for the Commission to 
retrieve the information needed to formulate a well-informed decision. 
 
Legal certainty is in contrast to the exemption ‘absolutely impossible’ a 
principle but it is applied in a manner resembling the non-principle 
‘absolutely impossible’. Granted, the courts do not ask whether it is 
absolutely impossible for the state to understand the recovery order but rather 
if it is feasible without too much difficulty. Based on the case law, a significant 
lack of clarity is accepted. Despite the significant lack of clarity in some 
recovery decisions, the court does not acknowledge a breach of legal 
certainty. In effect, the courts treat it as a question of binary nature: it is or it 
is not possible to understand the recovery decision.  
 
Since the state aid control system is stable, the system can tolerate a relaxed 
interpretation of the exemption absolutely impossible. However, caution is 
required. An interpretation too generous leads to the states left to determine 
whether they can execute a decision, a power which can be abused to engage 
in subsidy wars. Thus, no drastic changes are expected but the development 
is visible in a recent decision addressed to Italy. Granted, insufficient records 
have been a successful argument in the past but nevertheless the decision 
indicates a more generous interpretation, since the aid is not retrieved despite 
the fact that the aid would normally have been recovered.  
 
Considering the latest development of the interpretation of the excemption 
absolutely impossible and the stability of the state aid system, the 
interpretation of the principle of legal certainty and the exemption absolutely 
impossible can be relaxed slightly; with maintained functioning of the 
Internal market.  
10.3.4 The role of social upheaval 
The effect of an interim relief is temporary, making the case law at once less 
but also more relevant. They are less relevant since as a consequence of their 
temporary nature, the Union’s prerequisites are not quite as demanding. They 
are more relevant since the stakes are lower; the non-permanence allows the 
Union to experiment a little bit, the operative word being little. They indicate 
the trend; new possible directions of state aid recovery. It bears repeating that 
the successful interim cases are nonetheless scarce.  
 
Possibly finding inspiration in primary law, which recognise with which 
severity the financial crisis affects Europe, with the case Greece v 
Commission the court recognise the increased significance of social upheaval 
which is caused by the financial crisis, as an argument in state aid law. 
 
The case must be read in light of the state aid reforms. Changes initiated under 
SAM and SAAP aim to allow the Commission to concentrate on cases with 
the greatest impact on the Internal market. Arguably, in its ruling, the court 
finds that an immediate recovery from the Greek farmers is not of great 
importance to the Internal market. Surprisingly, the probability of success is 
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a relevant aspect. If the Member State is in great financial difficulty, an 
interim relief is more likely to succeed. Due to the financial constraints, in a 
regular recovery process the aid would most likely not be retrieved; it is better 
to allow the state to improve its financial situation before proceeding. 
 
A Member State’s general financial situation thus affects the speed by which 
the recovery is executed. The Union is creating a fast-track and a slow-track 
recovery system. Since the Union is more likely to pursue an Article 260(2) 
TFEU process where the Member state shows reluctance to execute recovery 
decisions, the nationality of the beneficiary is becoming increasingly 
important. The nationality is not affecting the decision itself but it affects the 
degree of enforcement. Considering not all decisions are executed, 
beneficiaries from financially stable states have in effect a slight 
disadvantage.  
 
An aim of SAM is to bring the Member State’s budget under balance. The 
court arguable contemplates the decision’s effect on the state aid control 
system in addition to its effect on the overall Internal market. The Internal 
market appears to be better helped by the Member States collecting taxes 
rather than collecting state aid. The more generous approach to interim reliefs 
is simultaneously contributing to the protection of the Internal market and the 
protection of the beneficiary. 
 
The new development in interim cases could possibly foreshadow an 
evolution of the interpretation of the exemption ‘absolutely impossible’. They 
have a comparable criterion. The interim relief’s irreversible damage, shares 
similarities with the criterion absolutely impossible. Further, the courts have 
not excluded social upheaval as a legitimate argument, they merely require 
extensive evidence, which was finally provided to the Court’s satisfaction in 
the interim case. Were the financial situation to decline further, a recovery 
could become absolutely impossible. Neither the functioning of the Internal 
market nor the ability to balance budgets benefit from a severely financially 
damaged Member State.  
 
To conclude, in certain situations, the financial stability of the Member States, 
as opposed to certain aspects of the state aid control system, is of greater 
importance to the protection of the Internal market. A Member State’s general 
financial situation affects the speed and level of enforcement of a recovery. 
The recent development in interim relief case law may foreshadow a reformed 
interpretation of the exception absolutely impossible.  
10.3.5 Proportionality 
The Court leaves no room for doubt that the size of the sum to be retrieved is 
not the object of an in-depth proportionality assessment. A flat recovery is by 
definition not objectionable. This section is not a misguided effort to analyse 
the development of the interpretation of the principle of proportionality. 
Rather, it is a de lege ferenda discussion of how the courts, within the orbit 
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of the aim of recovery, can construct a proportionality assessment of the sum 
to be recovered. 
 
A proportionality assessment is a part of the economic assessment, within 
which the Court may only perform a limited judicial review. Since the Court 
only conducts a limited judicial review, the case law does not prove that the 
Court finds a flat recovery proportionate; it only proves a flat recovery is not 
disproportionate. By ordering the payment of interest, which serves the 
purpose to render the aid’s real effect on the market, the Court  acknowledge 
that a more nuances proportionality assessment can be carried out within the 
orbit of the state aid control system. 
 
The nature of proportionality is such that the more important the aim, the 
more intrusive measures are allowed. State aid control shall protect the 
Internal market. It is an important task. Recovery is, in addition, technically 
not intrusive; it is merely a withdrawal of a benefit and not an invasive 
punishment. Hence, in theory, a flat recovery is not objectionable.  
 
Notably, the above paragraph is concerned with the general aim of state aid 
control, not the specific aim of reversing the anti-competitive effect. Nor does 
it analyse whether a flat recovery is effective. A flat recovery is in effect a 
recovery of the monetary benefit only. Without a more nuanced 
proportionality assessment, the recovery might not render the actual effect on 
the Internal market. Hence, a more nuanced proportionality assessment is 
benefitting the Internal market and the beneficiary alike.  
 
A more thorough assessment would cause increased administrative costs. 
Whereas the Court accepts increased administrative costs for the Member 
States, possibly because the Member State is the sinner, huge costs may not, 
without great justification, tax the Commission. Thus, considering the 
specific aim of recovery, the state aid system allows a more refined 
proportionality assessment of the sum but practical concerns prevent this 
development.  
 
As a summary, the current proportionality assessment contributes to retrieve 
the monetary benefit but not necessarily the anti-competitive effect.  
10.3.6 How diligent must the businessman be? 
In an implied proportionality assessment of a different kind, the Court asks 
what could reasonably be expected of a beneficiary; how diligent must a 
businessman be? The case law indicates that the short answer is: very.  
 
The state aid control system places a tall order on the beneficiary. The current 
case law illustrates that the question of what can be expected from a diligent 
businessman is often nearly rhetorical. The diligent businessman is expected 
to have a law degree. The system does consider the interest of the beneficiary 
a priority, as seen in legitimate expectation cases. However, the very fact that 
the Court asks what can be expected of a diligent businessman is interesting. 
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It indicates that the state aid control system shall pay some attention to the 
interest of the beneficiary, in addition to the protection of the Internal market.  
 
A purpose of this thesis is to present arguments in favour of the beneficiary. 
Notably, not all aspects of the current system are unreasonable. Asking the 
beneficiary to oversee the legality of all the aid from the last decade is a heavy 
burden but not an unreasonable request. Ten-year limits exist elsewhere.  
 
A fundamental flaw of the system is, however, that the businessman has all 
of the responsibility but only limited authority. While the Member States do 
have the option to notify the aid to the Commission, an action which makes a 
defence of recovery redundant, the beneficiary does not have the same 
opportunity. The beneficiary may inform the Commission once the aid is paid 
out but the beneficiary itself cannot notify, the aid to the Commission. If the 
Member State chooses  not to notify, the beneficiary is left either to abstain 
from the aid or to take a risk.  
 
Further, the time frame of a notification procedure is, as acknowledge by 
SAM, simply not business relevant. Lengthy procedures are not a carte 
blanche to ignore the rules but it is an aspect to take under consideration.  
 
As a result of the recent reforms, fewer situations ends with a defence of 
recovery process. As a result of the reforms, and even more so if the 
Commission would start to cherry pick cases, fewer defence cases will be 
successful. The most efficient defence of recovery is to never enter a defence 
of recovery process. To protect the interest of the weaker party, the 
beneficiaries should have access to the early procedures. They should be 
allowed to notify, be informed if the ten-year period is aborted and receive an 
improved standing.  
 
In contrast to the beneficiary, a Member State can notify and it does have 
standing, it is a formal party in the in-depth procedure. Whereas recovery is 
not a punishment, it does cause financial hardship on the businessman but not 
on the Member State. The current order does not greatly contribute to the aim 
of deterrence, since it does not make the polluter, the Member State,  pay.  
 
Actions under Article 260(2) TFEU are the exception. The recent 
development to increasingly utilise such procedures will not remedy the flaws 
of the current interpretation of the recovery obligation but it will prevent the 
need to ever recover. Granted, the monetary effect on the Member States, 
which an Article 260(2) procedure had, is not explicitly linked to the granting 
of the illicit aid; the purpose of the procedure is to cure the Member State’s 
recovery apathy. As a result of the process, the Member State’s actions will 
have consequences and not only for the beneficiary but also for the Member 
State. Further, in order to prevent unjust enrichment, the Union and not the 
Member State should be the recipient of the retrieved aid.  
 
To summarise, due to fundamental flaws of the system, the interest of the 
beneficiary should be taken into greater consideration. In addition to an 
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adjusted interpretation of the state aid rules, the procedural standing of the 
beneficiary should be improved. They are important to the beneficiary’s 
ability to defend itself, as is the increased use of procedures under Article 
260(2) TFEU, albeit they serve slightly different aims.  
10.4 In conclusion: de lege ferenda  
Bringing the interest of the beneficiary and the interest to protect the Internal 
market together is not easy; to do it to both interests’ complete satisfaction is 
impossible. It is not the aim of this thesis and nor does it have to be, rather 
the aim is to improve the beneficiary’s standing and position – the protection 
of the Internal market is not neglected but it has already has a strong position 
which will not become weaker – by finding and discussing aspects of the state 
aid control system which would work in the beneficiary’s favour but are 
currently underutilised.  
 
The scope of potential change is determined by two parameters. First, the 
stability of the Internal market and state aid control system, as it determines 
to what extent the Internal market needs protection. Historically, the actions 
of the Member States have been cause for concern but overprotection of the 
Internal market is nothing less than a waste of Union and Member State’s 
resources. An anlalysis of the case law, academic discussion, the structure of 
the state aid system and of certain aspects of similar legal areas leads to the 
conclusion that the system is stable. It is not a far distant goal; it is established 
and implemented.  
 
The second parameter is the aim of state aid recovery, since it determines the 
method to be used to provide the necessary level of protection. This parameter 
potentially provides common ground for the interest of the beneficiary and of 
the protection of the Internal market. The general aim of state aid recovery is 
to protect the Internal market but that goal can be dissected into sub-aims. 
The analysis identifies three sub-aims: recovering the monetary effect, 
reversing the anti-competitive effect and the deterrence effect. The aim to 
retrieve the monetary effect is currently unnecessary heavily prioritised. By 
increasingly prioritise the other two aims, most importantly the aim to reverse 
the anti-competitive effect, the Internal market would receive a more effective 
protection and possibly also improve the beneficiary’s situation.  
 
Within the orbit of the greater frame of scope of change, several adjustments 
of specific parts of the state aid system and case law are feasible. The system 
can provide the beneficiary with a more favourable interpretation of the 
principles of proportionality, legal certainty and legitimate expectations. The 
interpretation of the exemption not to retrieve if a recovery is absolutely 
impossible may be less narrow. 
 
Greater deterrence is achieved by adjusting the interpretation of the principle 
of legal certainty. Further, the social and financial stability of the Member 
States may, in certain cases, be more important to the protection of the 
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Internal market than an immediate recovery. This is an advantage for the 
beneficiary.  
 
The case law as it stands offers very little relief to the beneficiary; even when 
using the underutilised aspects of the state aid control system, the beneficiary 
will be at the mercy of exemptions, thus, even after certain adjustments of the 
system, a defence in a recovery case will most likely not be successful. Yet, 
the beneficiary have no reason to worry greatly. The reality is such that in the 
future a beneficiary is even less likely to have to participate in a defence of a 
recovery process; and when it does, it should have received an improved 
standing. The new system should and to some extent will, provide more 
opportunities not to not have to be exposed to a recovery decision.   
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